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Lawyers and Fools: Lawyer-Directors in Public
Corporations
LUBOMIR P. LITOV,* SIMONE M. SEPE,** AND CHARLES K. WHITEHEAD***
The accepted wisdom—that a lawyer who becomes a corporate director has a
fool for a client—is outdated. The benefits of lawyer-directors in today’s world
significantly outweigh the costs. Beyond monitoring, they help manage litiga-
tion and regulation, as well as structure compensation to align CEO and
shareholder interests. The results have been an average 9.5% increase in firm
value and an almost doubling in the percentage of public companies with
lawyer-directors.
This Article is the first to analyze the rise of lawyer-directors. It makes a
variety of other empirical contributions, each of which is statistically significant
and large in magnitude. First, it explains why the number of lawyer-directors
has increased. Among other reasons, businesses subject to greater litigation and
regulation as well as firms with significant intangible assets, such as patents,
value a lawyer-director’s expertise. Second, this Article describes the impact of
lawyer-directors on corporate monitoring. Among other results, it shows that
lawyer-directors are more likely to favor a board structure and takeover de-
fenses that potentially reduce shareholder value—balanced, however, by the
benefits of lawyer-directors, such as the valuable advice they can provide.
Finally, this Article analyzes the significant reduction in risk-taking and the
increase in firm value that results from having a lawyer on the board.
Our findings fly in the face of requirements that focus on director indepen-
dence. Our results show that board composition—and the training, skills, and
experience that directors bring to managing a business—can be at least as
valuable to the firm and its shareholders.
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INTRODUCTION
For over a half-century, the legal profession has debated whether lawyers
should be directors of public corporations.1 The accepted wisdom has been that
lawyers should steer clear of public company boards.2 A lawyer-director3 is less
able to objectively assess board actions in which she participates,4 and if she
is outside counsel, she is also less able to monitor and manage the executives
who pay her legal fees.5 Those costs are significant and outweigh the benefits
she brings to the board—her ability to spot issues,6 provide a perspective on
1. See John F.X. Peloso et al., The Lawyer-Director: Implications for Independence: Report of the
Task Force on the Independent Lawyer, 1998 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. REP. 17–35 [hereinafter ABA TASK
FORCE REPORT] (describing the history of ethical concerns over a lawyer serving as a director of a
corporate client).
2. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
3. In this Article, the term “lawyer-director” refers to a director of a public corporation with a legal
degree, see infra note 113, regardless of whether she is practicing as a lawyer or as outside counsel to
the firm at the time she is on the board.
4. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
6. See Craig C. Albert, The Lawyer-Director: An Oxymoron?, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 413, 417–18
(1996); Report and Recommendations of the Comm. on Lawyer Bus. Ethics of the ABA Section of Bus.
Law, The Lawyer as Director of a Client, 57 BUS. LAW. 387, 388 (2001) [hereinafter ABA Report and
Recommendations] (offering guidance on whether and how a lawyer should become a director).
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decisions that nonlawyers may not have,7 and assist in navigating legal and
regulatory problems as they arise.8 In short, a lawyer who represents her-
self—by acting as both a lawyer and a director—has a fool for a client.
This Article explains why the accepted wisdom is outdated and, more gener-
ally, why an assessment of board function must include an analysis of board
composition, including the effect of the firm’s environment on the skills and
experience that directors bring to their work. The costs of being a lawyer-
director can still be significant, but the balance has now shifted in its favor—
reflecting a lawyer-director’s ability to assist the board in managing the sig-
nificant rise in litigation and regulation affecting businesses9 and changes in
CEO compensation that occur when a lawyer is on the board.10 In fact, based on
an average of 10,000 or more observations from 2000 to 2009,11 we find a
statistically and economically significant increase in firm value (as measured by
Tobin’s Q12) of nonfinancial companies that have a lawyer on the board.13 A
lawyer-director increases firm value by 9.5%, and when the lawyer-director is
also a company executive, the firm’s value increases by 10.2%.14 The result has
been an almost doubling in the percentage of public companies with lawyer-
directors from 2000 to 2009.15
This Article is the first to analyze the rise in lawyer-directors. It makes a
variety of other empirical contributions—each of which is statistically signifi-
cant and also large in magnitude—in addition to explaining this important shift
in board composition.
We begin by explaining why the number of lawyer-directors has grown.16
7. See ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
8. See Micalyn S. Harris & Karen L. Valihura, Outside Counsel as Director: The Pros and Potential
Pitfalls of Dual Service, 53 BUS. LAW. 479, 482–83 (1998); Robert H. Mundheim, Should Code of
Professional Responsibility Forbid Lawyers to Serve on Boards of Corporations For Which They Act as
Counsel?, 33 BUS. LAW. 1507, 1508, 1511 (1978) (noting the importance of an “appropriate relation-
ship” between counsel and a board that represents public shareholders); Harold M. Williams, Corporate
Accountability and the Lawyer’s Role, 34 BUS. LAW. 7, 10 (1978) (describing the view that lawyer-
directors have “special knowledge of litigation and other matters of vital significance to directors”).
9. See infra Table 6, Panel C, and notes 102–04 and accompanying text. A board’s perceptions, even
if they overstate actual legal exposure, can also favor having a lawyer-director. See infra note 104 and
accompanying text.
10. See infra Table 6, Panel B, and accompanying text.
11. The actual number of observations varies with the applicable analysis and appears in each table
within this Article.
12. See infra note 118.
13. The empirical findings described in this Article are based on data that exclude financial
institutions. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Table 6, Panel A, and accompanying text.
15. The percentage of public companies with lawyer-directors was 24.5% in 2000, up to 47.5% in
2005, and 43.9% in 2009. See infra Figure 1 and note 107 and accompanying text.
16. Based on our sample, the number of lawyer-directors was 340 (in 1393 firms) in 2000 and 541
(in 1237 firms) in 2009, with a high of 642 (in 1357 firms) in 2007. The average number of independent
directors in public companies also grew over the last thirty years. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black,
The Non-correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L.
231, 232 (2002).
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Only recently have studies examined the effect on board composition of the
environment in which a firm operates.17 We add to those studies by showing
that businesses with intangible assets, such as patents,18 value lawyer-directors
who can assist in protecting those assets.19 Firms that are more likely to be
involved in litigation also benefit from having a lawyer on the board.20 In
addition, we identify the greater likelihood of having a lawyer-director as a
business becomes more complex.21
Next, we describe the impact of lawyer-directors on corporate monitoring and
incentives. We consider the decline in CEO risk-taking incentives that occurs
with a lawyer-director.22 In addition, we analyze changes in board structure—
such as whether the CEO is also board chairman—and takeover protections—
such as the addition of a poison pill or classified board—that can insulate the
board and CEO from shareholder oversight.23 We also consider the effect of
lawyer-directors on board integrity, using as a proxy the substantial decline in
stock-option-backdating litigation when a lawyer is on the board.24 Our results
are consistent with lawyer-directors providing meaningful oversight over senior
managers, similar to recent changes in board composition and director–officer
relationships described by others.25 In addition, diversity among directors can
17. See Eric Helland & Michael Sykuta, Regulation and the Evolution of Corporate Boards:
Monitoring, Advising, or Window Dressing?, 47 J.L. & ECON. 167, 168 (2004).
18. Intellectual property rights have become an increasingly important source of cash and noncash
value for corporations. See MARSHALL PHELPS & DAVID KLINE, BURNING THE SHIPS: INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF MICROSOFT 89–95 (2009) (describing Microsoft’s ability to leverage
intellectual property into value-producing assets); see also Bronwyn H. Hall, Exploring the Patent
Explosion, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF EDWIN MANSFIELD: THE ECONOMICS OF R&D, INNOVATION, AND TECH-
NOLOGICAL CHANGE 195, 197 (Albert N. Link & F.M. Scherer eds., 2005). Global intellectual property
licensing revenues approached or exceeded $90 billion per year between 2003 and 2010. See Anne
Kelley, Practicing in the Patent Marketplace, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 115 (2011). Nevertheless, 99% of
patent owners never file suit to enforce their rights, see Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the
Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1501 (2001), although litigated patents are likely to be among
the most valuable patents to a firm, see John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435,
435–37, 439–43 (2004). Notwithstanding the relatively small number of litigated patents, patent case
filings rose from 1991 to 2008 in line with (and at a rate exceeding) the grant of new patents, and since
2005, at least ten significant federal district court decisions have awarded patent holders amounts in ex-
cess of $100 million. See ARON LEVKO ET AL., A CLOSER LOOK: PATENT LITIGATION TRENDS AND THE INCREAS-
ING IMPACT OF NONPRACTICING ENTITIES 4, 7 (2009), available at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-
services/publications/assets/2009-patent-litigation-study.pdf. In cases that went to trial, nonpracticing
entities and practicing entities were successful, respectively, 67.4% and 65.8% of the time. See id. at 12.
19. See infra Table 1 and accompanying text.
20. See infra Table 1 and accompanying text. This benefit is consistent with the common explanation
for the recent rise in lawyer-CEOs. Increases in regulation and greater litigation, it has been reported,
provide one reason for the increase in CEOs with a legal background. See Mark Curriden, CEO, Esq.:
Why Lawyers Are Being Asked to Lead Some of the Nation’s Largest Corporations, 96 A.B.A. J. 31, 31,
33 (2010).
21. See infra Table 1 and accompanying text.
22. See infra Table 5, Panel B, and accompanying text.
23. See infra Table 3 and accompanying text.
24. See infra Table 4 and accompanying text.
25. The recent changes in board composition have been described by Professors Marcel Kahan and
Edward Rock. Among other characteristics, Professors Kahan and Rock indicate that outside directors
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improve the quality of a board’s decisions, partly by bringing a depth of
perspective that may not be present if the board is comprised of only like-
minded people.26
Finally, we describe the benefits of having a lawyer-director. Our intuition is
that a lawyer’s training and experience, and the judgment that comes with it,
can add value to a board’s decision making and promote more informed
monitoring, as well as assist in managing litigation and regulatory costs.27 A
lawyer-director brings a special perspective based on her experience with the
law and legal issues, and an appreciation of doing things “by the book” that
likely comes with that experience.28 In fact, we find that financial stability is
likely to increase as a result of a lawyer-director’s influence on decisions
regarding litigation29 and CEO compensation.30 Although lawyer-directors may
favor a board structure and takeover defenses that can reduce shareholder
welfare,31 the potential decline is balanced by the benefits of lawyer-directors,
such as the valuable advice they can provide.32 As noted earlier, the result is an
increase in firm value by 9.5%, and for inside lawyer-directors, the increase
rises further to 10.2%.33
Could those results be replicated by a lawyer who advises the board, rather
than joins it? We think not. A lawyer-director is more likely than outside coun-
sel to attend board meetings and have access to information needed to properly
advise the board.34 She may also become aware of new information at an earlier
stage, enabling her to flag concerns as they arise.35 In particular, she can assist
her colleagues to better understand legal and regulatory problems and, as
necessary, act as a bridge between the board and outside advisors to resolve
them.36 Directors and managers are also more inclined to follow the advice of a
are more likely to enjoy a less collegial relationship with insiders, have occasional need to be
confrontational, and deal more often with shareholders. Directors who may be well qualified for the
position, they suggest, include “retired CEOs and other retired high-level executives, bankers, accoun-
tants, consultants, or investment professionals.” Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88
TEX. L. REV. 987, 1044 (2010). To their list, we would also add lawyers.
26. See Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, Advocates, 107 J. POL. ECON. 1, 4, 29–30 (1999)
(providing a formal discussion of the use of advocacy systems within various organizational contexts);
see also infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.
27. See Constance E. Bagley, Winning Legally: The Value of Legal Astuteness, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
378, 381–82 (2008).
28. See id. at 380–81.
29. See infra Table 5, Panels C and D, and accompanying text.
30. See infra Table 5, Panel B, and accompanying text.
31. See infra Table 3 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 214–17, 220, 225–26 and accompanying text.
33. See infra Table 6, Panel A, and accompanying text.
34. See Harris & Valihura, supra note 8, at 482–83 (describing how a lawyer-director is able to
counsel the board before outside legal advice becomes necessary); Mundheim, supra note 8, at 1514.
35. See Harris & Valihura, supra note 8, at 482–83.
36. See Bagley, supra note 27, at 381, 383.
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colleague who shares equal responsibility for its outcome.37 That may be
particularly true of lawyer-directors in light of the higher standards to which the
courts have held them.38
This Article’s approach to the board differs from the standard framing com-
mon in much of corporate law scholarship, which often focuses on problems
that arise from separating ownership and control.39 The board responds to the
resulting agency costs by monitoring senior managers on behalf of dispersed
shareholders.40 Our study looks outside the corporation to external factors—the
business environment in which the firm operates—that can also affect the board
and how it is organized.41 Which skills are optimal will be shaped over time by
changes in those factors.42 In addition, our study looks at the experience and
skills that lawyer-directors bring to managing the business, advancing corporate
interests, and contributing to decision making.43 The results suggest that an
“ideal” board is likely to reflect circumstances that are particular to each firm.
By filling substantive gaps in how the company is managed, board composition
can help increase firm value. Consequently, interfering with the ability of
shareholders and directors to order their own affairs potentially imposes a less
efficient, less flexible model on organizations with different needs and character-
istics. For that reason, we argue, a one-size-fits-all approach to regulating the
board can bring with it its own costs, impairing shareholder welfare if it limits
the firm’s ability to respond to external change.44
37. See Albert, supra note 6, at 417–18 (discussing the board’s potential reluctance to follow the
advice of outside counsel who does not share the same responsibility).
38. See ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 50–56; James D. Cox, The Paradoxical Corporate
and Securities Law Implications of Counsel Serving on the Client’s Board, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 541, 542
(2002).
39. See Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 268–75 (1997) (describing
two basic functions of the board: monitoring and managing).
40. See Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an Endogenously
Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature, 9 ECON. POL’Y REV. 7, 9–10 (2003);
Roberta Romano, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, 5 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 277, 277–78
(1996).
41. See Jeffrey Pfeffer, Size and Composition of Corporate Boards of Directors: The Organization
and Its Environment, 17 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 218, 219 (1972).
42. See Helland & Sykuta, supra note 17, at 168–69; Amy J. Hillman et al., The Resource
Dependence Role of Corporate Directors: Strategic Adaptation of Board Composition in Response to
Environmental Change, 37 J. MGMT. STUD. 235, 236 (2000) (finding that, in response to deregulation of
the U.S. airline industry, U.S. airline companies altered their board structure to reflect new business
uncertainties).
43. See Violina P. Rindova, What Corporate Boards Have to Do with Strategy: A Cognitive
Perspective, 36 J. MGMT. STUD. 953, 960 (1999). Importantly, the effect of having a lawyer-director is
significant even after controlling for the effect of outside directors. In other words, for the variables that
we consider, the value provided by a lawyer-director is greater than the value provided by a nonlawyer,
outside director. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
44. See infra discussion in section IV.B; see also Fisch, supra note 39, at 284–89 (noting that
“[i]deal board structure . . . depends on board function” and describing firm-specific characteristics that
may change board function); Larry E. Ribstein, The Mandatory Nature of the ALI Code, 61 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 984, 993 (1993) (finding that outside directors can benefit firms, but “they also may impose
costs . . . that outweigh monitoring benefits”).
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In Part I, we describe the monitoring and managing functions of the board,
and the effect that a firm’s external environment can have on board composi-
tion.
Part II describes our data on lawyer-directors and the firm characteristics that
are likely to result in having a lawyer on the board. We find that a board is more
likely to include a lawyer-director (i) as the firm becomes subject to more
litigation, including patent litigation; (ii) with an increase in firm size; (iii) if the
firm is listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE); and (iv) as the firm
becomes more complex. A firm is also more likely to add a lawyer to its board if
other firms in the same industry have lawyer-directors or when one or more
current directors serves on a different board that has a lawyer-director.
In Part III, we consider the implications of our results on corporate monitor-
ing and incentives. A lawyer-director causes a change in CEO incentives that
more closely align CEO and shareholder interests. She is also more likely to
favor the adoption of takeover defenses such as classified boards and poison
pills. In addition, we find a significant drop in the likelihood of stock-option-
backdating litigation when a lawyer is on the board.
Part IV considers the substantial benefits of having a lawyer-director, includ-
ing a decline in risk-taking and an increase in firm value. We argue, based on
our results, that board composition—and the training, substantive skills, and
experience that directors bring to managing a business—can be as or more
valuable to the firm and its shareholders than current requirements that focus on
director independence.
I. THE MONITORING AND MANAGING BOARD
A central focus of corporate law scholarship is the function of the board. Two
basic models have emerged that seek to explain directors’ responsibilities and
interactions with parties in and around the corporation.45 The dominant model is
premised on agency costs, assigning to the board a monitoring function that can
improve firm performance by reducing inefficiencies.46 The second model
considers the board to be a provider of management resources, including human
capital (such as experience, expertise, and reputation) and relational capital
(such as ties to other firms and regulators). Under this “resource dependence”
approach, the board spans the divide between the company and its external
environment, improving firm performance through its ability to assist in manag-
ing the company’s business.47 Both functions coexist within the board,48 even
45. See Amy J. Hillman & Thomas Dalziel, Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: Integrating
Agency and Resource Dependence Perspectives, 28 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 383, 383 (2003) (observing that
boards monitor management on behalf of shareholders and provide resources).
46. See Nicola Faith Sharpe, The Cosmetic Independence of Corporate Boards, 34 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 1435, 1440–51 (2011).
47. See Pfeffer, supra note 41, at 218–19; see also Hillman et al., supra note 42, at 239–42; Hillman
& Dalziel, supra note 45, at 383.
48. See infra notes 85–92 and accompanying text; see also Robert Charles Clark, Corporate
Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers Too,
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though the latter has been much less explored.49
The standard framing arises from the separation of ownership and control that
Berle and Means identified in the public corporation.50 That separation was the
result of increased specialization by managers and capital providers. Managers
developed specific skills in order to better operate the firm within an evolving
and competitive marketplace.51 Investors relied on liquidity in the public market
in order to diversify risk at lower cost.52 The result was greater independence of
the managers, who relied on dispersed shareholders for low-cost equity capital
while retaining control over the firm’s day-to-day operations. Shareholders, in
turn, received ownership-type benefits, such as voting rights and fiduciary
duties, in order to limit the resulting agency costs.53
Over time, board structure has also reflected shareholder attempts to fur-
ther minimize agency costs.54 Although by statute, a corporation’s business is
managed “by or under” the board’s direction,55 realistically, directors are unable
to operate a company on their own.56 Corporation law, therefore, permits the
22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 278–82 (2005) (describing the interaction between the monitoring and
management functions); Fisch, supra note 39, at 282–89; Hillman & Dalziel, supra note 45, at 388–94.
49. See Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, A Theory of Friendly Boards, 62 J. FIN. 217, 217–18
(2007); Hillman & Dalziel, supra note 45, at 383.
50. See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 4–9, 277–81 (1932).
51. See Lyman P. Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers are Fiduciaries,
46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1618–19 (2005); see also ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE:
THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 51–89 (1990) (explaining how changes in markets and
technology underlie growth of corporate managerial hierarchies); ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE
HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 484–500 (1977) (describing growth of
professional managers in U.S. corporations).
52. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 301, 302–03 (1983) (exploring residual claims within a model of an organization as a “nexus of
contracts”).
53. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
63–67 (1991); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON.
395, 401–06 (1983).
54. Monitoring was not historically a primary function of the board, but grew in importance as
institutional shareholders looked for new means to deter management misconduct. See Franklin A.
Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV.
89, 169–70 (2004); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States,
1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1469 (2007); see
also Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism:
Theories and Evidence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 898, 900 n.4 (1996) (compiling sources that suggest that
electing outside independent directors can deter management misconduct).
55. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2012) (“The business and affairs of every corporation
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except
as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.”); see also, e.g., Mills
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989) (“It is basic to our law that the
board of directors has the ultimate responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a corpora-
tion.”).
56. See Grimes v. Donald, No. 13358, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 3, at *25–26 (Del. Ch. Jan. 12, 1995)
(“[T]he law recognizes that corporate boards, comprised as they traditionally have been of persons
dedicating less than all of their attention to that role, . . . may satisfy their obligations by thoughtfully
appointing officers, establishing or approving goals and plans and monitoring performance.”).
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board to delegate managerial duties to the firm’s officers,57 while directors, as
fiduciaries, remain obligated to monitor those officers for the shareholders’
benefit.58 Specifically, shareholders rely on the board to select, compensate,
review, and—when appropriate—replace the senior executives who run the
firm,59 delegating to the CEO and her team the authority to make day-to-day
decisions that affect the company and its affairs.60 Shareholders who are
unhappy with the outcome can vote out the existing board or sell their shares.61
The focus on monitoring prompted well-founded concerns over the di-
rectors’ ability to oversee senior managers.62 Until recently,63 CEOs exercised
57. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(b) (2012) (permitting the board to select officers in the manner
“prescribed by the by-laws or determined by the board of directors”).
58. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 53, at 91; Clark, supra note 48, at 278–79; Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 440–41
(2001); Johnson & Millon, supra note 51, at 1607–08; see also Nicola Faith Sharpe, Questioning
Authority: The Critical Link Between Board Power and Process, 38 J. CORP. L. 1, 8–9 (2012) (noting
that “the board plays both an active and passive role in ensuring that managers work to maximize
shareholder value”).
59. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 3.01 (1994); see also Johnson & Millon, supra note 51, at 1605–08.
60. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 59, § 3.01; Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Def-
erence: Behavioral Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673,
724 (2005) (“The Delaware corporation code, for example, provides that ‘[t]he business and affairs of
every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of [the] board of directors.’ In other
words, the CEO has control because the board, as a matter of course, delegates it to the chief
executive.” (citation omitted)). Under state law, plaintiffs face a high hurdle in trying to hold the board
liable for a failure to monitor the company. In order to prevail, a plaintiff must prove either (a) “the
directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or controls” to monitor the
business or (b) “having implemented such a system or controls, [the directors] consciously failed to
monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems
requiring their attention.” Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). In either case, “imposition of
liability requires a showing that the directors knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary
obligations” and were “demonstrating a conscious disregard for their responsibilities.” Id. Claims for
failure to monitor have almost always involved illegality or fraud by officers or employees of the
company, see Robert T. Miller, The Board’s Duty to Monitor Risk After Citigroup, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
1153, 1157–58 (2010), although a recent decision involving the Citigroup board’s alleged failure to
monitor company risk-taking left open the possibility of a plaintiff meeting its burden even if there was
no illegality, see In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 126 (Del. Ch. 2009). The
board’s monitoring obligation was modified for public companies under section 404 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006 & Supp. IV), which requires the CEO and CFO pe-
riodically to publicly certify that they are familiar with the company’s internal controls and have
disclosed all deficiencies or material weaknesses to the company’s independent auditor.
61. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d
906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (“The redress for failures that arise from faithful management must come from
the markets, through the action of shareholders and the free flow of capital, and not from th[e] Court.”);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735,
1749–51 (2006); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to
Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1763–64 (2006).
62. See Lynne L. Dallas, The Multiple Roles of Corporate Boards of Directors, 40 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 781, 782 (2003) (noting that the “main focus” for the reform of corporate boards has been on the
monitoring role).
63. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 25, at 1022–32 (describing the loss of CEO power to corporate
boards).
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significant influence over the board and its decision-making process.64 Because
CEOs could determine board composition, directors were limited in their ability
to supervise CEO conduct.65 A poorly performing CEO could also “capture”
directors who were unwilling to remove someone they had appointed and
whose performance could reflect on their own business skills.66 Over time,
proxy contests, hostile takeovers, concentrated share ownership, and activist
investors were each identified as effective means to reinvigorate board over-
sight.67 Each looked to enhance director independence68 in light of the conven-
tional wisdom that independent directors are the most effective monitors.69
Their special position was bolstered by court decisions that applied a more
deferential standard of review to the judgments they made.70 Their role—and
the board’s monitoring function—was reinforced by regulatory and quasi-
regulatory requirements that increased the number of independent directors on
the board71 and assigned to them specific board-level duties.72
64. See MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 72–85, 190–94 (1971); Johnson & Millon,
supra note 51, at 1613–20.
65. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 57 (2008);
Gordon, supra note 54, at 1496.
66. See Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent
Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls,
93 GEO. L.J. 285, 290–95 (2004). Other problems with capture arise from norms of collegiality that
make it difficult for directors to question managers and the professional and social ties that bind
directors and officers. See MACEY, supra note 65, at 58–61.
67. See Bainbridge, supra note 61, at 1741 (suggesting that increased shareholder litigation has
helped limit the risk of managerial abuse of power); Jens Dammann, Corporate Ostracism: Freezing
Out Controlling Shareholders, 33 J. CORP. L. 681, 687–88 (2008) (noting that controlling shareholders
subject managers to increased scrutiny); Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America
1950–2000: Major Changes but Uncertain Benefits, 25 J. CORP. L. 349, 353–64 (2000) (describing how
recent developments, including the rise of institutional investors and leverage buy-outs, have helped
reform corporate governance); Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the
Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 867 (1993) (contending that activist investors are an
effective means of reinvigorating board oversight).
68. See Gordon, supra note 54, at 1520–40; Kahan & Rock, supra note 25, at 995–1037.
69. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 16, at 233. Notwithstanding the conventional wisdom, the
empirical support for the value of independent directors to the firm has been mixed. See id.; Lin, supra
note 54, at 968 app. I (listing eight studies, two with a positive correlation between outside directors
and firm performance, one indicating an increase in outside directors after poor firm performance, one
with a negative correlation, three with no correlation, and one with mixed results).
70. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1001–02 (N.Y. 1979) (applying the business
judgment standard to the decision of a committee of independent directors to terminate a shareholder
derivative suit); see also Dallas, supra note 62, at 786.
71. The definition of “independence” is also strict. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY
MANUAL § 303A.02 (2012), available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm [hereinafter NYSE MANUAL].
Under the New York Stock Exchange rules, among other requirements for a director to be independent,
she cannot have been an employee of the corporation during the preceding three years and cannot have
a close relative who is an employee. See id. § 303A.02(a)–(b)(i). Economic ties, such as a position in
another company that does significant business with the corporation, may also disqualify a director
from being independent. See id. § 303A.02(b)(v).
72. For example, New York Stock Exchange rules require most companies listed on the exchange
to have a majority of independent directors on their boards. See id. § 303A.01. The rules also require
independent directors to comprise key board committees, including the audit, compensation, and
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A key to the monitoring model is understanding the incentives that drive
director oversight. Independent directors are the monitors of choice, in large
part due to concerns that insiders (current and former managers) and dependent
outsiders (who are economically tied to the firm) have little incentive to actively
supervise the firm’s managers. Boards dominated by independent directors are
better monitors because they lack the incentives to simply defer to senior
management.73 The problem is that insiders and dependent outsiders—precisely
because of their close ties to the firm—may be best positioned to assess a senior
manager’s performance.74 They have direct access to information about the
company and its operations,75 unlike independent directors whose source of
information is more likely to be management itself.76 Moreover, insiders and
dependent outsiders may bring to the board other valuable resources that benefit
the firm—through their knowledge of the business and experience in the
industry—that independent directors, because of their independence, may not be
able to provide.77
This attention to director resources presents a version of the board that dif-
fers from the standard monitoring model. In it, the board participates in manag-
ing the business, with a greater emphasis on supporting, rather than evaluating,
the firm’s senior officers, as well as securing resources and reducing uncertainty
around the company’s operations.78 It is a role that in Delaware is reflected in
the statute granting the board its authority—declaring the business of the cor-
poration to be “managed” by or under the board79 without reference to monitor-
nominating committees, see id. §§ 303A.04(a), .05(a), .06, .07(b), with heightened standards of in-
dependence for audit committee directors, see id. § 303A.02. The audit committee must have the
express power to hire, fire, and compensate the firm’s independent auditors. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j–1(m)(2) (2006). All members of the audit committee must also be
financially literate. See NYSE MANUAL, supra note 71, § 303A.07(a), cmt. In addition, the board must
determine whether one or more of the audit committee members is a “financial expert.” See Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 § 407, 15 U.S.C. § 7265. The board must disclose the identity of the expert(s) or
explain why none of the members qualify as a financial expert. See 15 U.S.C. § 7265(a).
73. See William B. Chandler III, On the Instructiveness of Insiders, Independents, and Institutional
Investors, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1084 (1999); Lynne L. Dallas, The Relational Board: Three
Theories of Corporate Boards of Directors, 22 J. CORP. L. 1, 4–5 (1996); Lin, supra note 54, at 901.
74. See Barry Baysinger & Robert E. Hoskisson, The Composition of Boards of Directors and
Strategic Control: Effects on Corporate Strategy, 15 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 72, 76–77, 80–81 (1990).
75. See id. at 78–79.
76. See Adams & Ferreira, supra note 49, at 218 (noting the CEO’s incentive to withhold informa-
tion from the board because the probability of board intervention is greater as more information is
provided); Langevoort, supra note 66, at 293–94; Sharpe, supra note 46, at 1453–55. Stock prices have
grown increasingly informative, providing an additional source of feedback on company performance
for independent directors. See Gordon, supra note 54, at 1469–70.
77. See, e.g., Ronald W. Masulis et al., Do Independent Expert Directors Matter?, NAT’L INVESTOR
REL. INST. 4–5 (June 1, 2012), http://www.niri.org/Other-Content/sampledocs/Ronald-W-Masulisa-
Christian-Ruzzierb-et-al-Do-Independent-Expert-Directors-Matter-June-2012.aspx.
78. See Dallas, supra note 73, at 11 (describing the function of the board of directors as a bridging
strategy); Rindova, supra note 43, at 964–65 (relating the experience of the GM board as an example of
this type of management).
79. See supra note 55.
2014] 423LAWYERS AND FOOLS
ing.80 The benefits include the advice and counsel that directors can provide to
managers, coordination between the firm and external bodies (such as regula-
tors), and access to a broad network of contacts.81 From that perspective,
optimal board composition should depend, in part, on the firm’s operational
environment and the business strategies it intends to pursue.82 For example,
although a lawyer can provide particular expertise on legal or regulatory
concerns, the value of that insight will vary with the environment in which the
firm does business.83 As the environment changes, optimal board composition
should change as well.84
Scholars have suggested that the monitoring and management functions are
in conflict,85 leading to some concern that the two may not be compatible—that
one may substitute for the other.86 The role of monitor can dampen the
collegiality needed for directors to participate in managing the company; like-
wise, greater involvement in managing the business may cause a loss of the
objectivity needed to adequately monitor performance.87 The key is that, while
directors may engage in both functions,88 different boards are likely to do so to
different degrees depending on their particular circumstances.89 In that respect,
the two functions can also be complementary. A director whose experience
benefits the board’s managing function may, through her expertise, also be able
to more closely monitor how managers perform.90 Likewise, a firm that princi-
pally benefits from an outside director’s monitoring may use her industry
knowledge and external relationships to assist in its business operations.91
80. See Clark, supra note 48, at 279.
81. See Catherine M. Daily & Charles Schwenk, Chief Executive Officers, Top Management Teams,
and Boards of Directors: Congruent or Countervailing Forces?, 22 J. MGMT. 185, 190–191, 194, 196
(1996); Dallas, supra note 73, at 12; Hillman et al., supra note 42, at 241. For example, if politics are
important to firm profitability, the number of lawyer-directors and directors with political experience—
who have knowledge of government procedures and insight into government actions—is likely to be
greater. See Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, Do Some Outside Directors Play a Political Role?,
44 J.L. & ECON. 179, 180, 195 (2001). Likewise, for natural gas companies between 1930 and 1998,
greater regulation was associated with an increase in the number of political directors on the board,
while deregulation was associated with a decrease. See Helland & Sykuta, supra note 17, at 168–69.
82. See Dallas, supra note 62, at 807–08; Helland & Sykuta, supra note 17, at 169–70.
83. See Dallas, supra note 62, at 806.
84. See Hillman et al., supra note 42, at 242–44; Pfeffer, supra note 41, at 226.
85. See MACEY, supra note 65, at 54.
86. See Dallas, supra note 62, at 783.
87. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations
of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1753–59 (2001) (discussing the efficiency of promoting
trust in corporate relationships); Fisch, supra note 39, at 280–81 (discussing the sacrifice in assessing
executive performance that results when board members work closely with upper-level management);
see also Tamar Frankel, Corporate Boards of Directors: Advisors or Supervisors?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV.
501, 502–04 (2008).
88. See Dallas, supra note 62, at 782–83; Hillman & Dalziel, supra note 45, at 388.
89. See Fisch, supra note 39, at 268, 282–89; Eric J. Pan, Rethinking the Board’s Duty to Monitor: A
Critical Assessment of the Delaware Doctrine, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 209, 223–24 (2011).
90. See Dallas, supra note 62, at 802, 812. But see MACEY, supra note 65, at 54 (stating that directors
face an “inescapable conflict” when they evaluate decisions in which they participated).
91. See Dallas, supra note 62, at 805–06; Fisch, supra note 39, at 274.
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Finally, the two functions may overlap in practice. Knowing the board will take
an interest in her activities, a senior officer is more likely to take extra care to
gather the relevant facts, weigh the different options, anticipate competing
considerations, and clarify the proposed course of action. Although the board
may view its participation as managerial support, the senior officer is likely to
treat it the same way she would a formal monitoring of her performance.92
In the next Part, we begin to consider the role of lawyer-directors on the
boards of public corporations. Lawyer-directors bring special skills to the board
that can affect board decisions and firm behavior.93 Experienced practitioners
offer a perspective on litigation and regulation that can benefit the board’s
deliberations.94 Moreover, trained in advocacy, a lawyer-director’s willingness
to pursue a particular course of action—potentially at odds with others on the
board—can bring a diverse and valuable perspective to board discussions.95 Of
course, diversity in the boardroom can have a cost—conflict can weaken the
collegiality needed to work as a group96—but directors can temper their discus-
sions in order to take advantage of the broader set of experiences that lawyers
can contribute.97
II. THE RISE OF THE LAWYER-DIRECTOR
In this Part and in Parts III and IV, we present our analysis of data on
lawyer-directors on the boards of U.S. public nonfinancial corporations from
92. See Clark, supra note 48, at 280–81.
93. See A. Burak Güner et al., Financial Expertise of Directors, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 323, 324–26 (2008)
(finding that directors with financial expertise who are commercial or investment bankers influence
corporate policies in favor of more external financing, potentially at shareholder expense); Ben W.
Lewis et al., Difference in Degrees: CEO Characteristics and Firm Responses to Pressures for
Disclosure 3 (May 21, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id2063838 (finding that CEO characteristics also effect firm behavior and, in
particular, that lawyer-CEOs are less receptive to shareholder requests). Although the effect of director
independence on firm profitability has been unclear, see Bhagat & Black, supra note 16, at 233, more
recent research suggests that a focus on independence alone may not reflect the characteristics that are
relevant to performance, see Masulis et al., supra note 77, at 4–5 (concluding that independent experts
with industry experience significantly improve firm performance). Instead, directors with industry-
specific knowledge are more likely to be present on the boards of more complex firms and, among other
effects, enhance firm performance, lower the likelihood of earnings restatements, improve the CEO’s
pay-for-performance sensitivity, and boost innovation. See id. at 6–7.
94. See Ronald C. Anderson et al., The Economics of Director Heterogeneity, 40 FIN. MGMT. 5, 6
(2011) (discussing the effects of board heterogeneity in bringing a variety of perspectives and skills to
decision making).
95. See Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of Direc-
tors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1406 (2002); Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of
Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1306–11 (2003); Rindova, supra note 43, at 960. In particular,
diverse occupational backgrounds can enhance how well a firm performs, with an even greater effect on
performance if the firm is operationally complex. See Anderson et al., supra note 94, at 6–7.
96. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 810–11 (2001).
97. See Dallas, supra note 62, at 814–15; Marta A. Geletkanycz & Sylvia Sloan Black, Bound by
the Past? Experience-Based Effects on Commitment to the Strategic Status Quo, 27 J. MGMT. 3, 15–16
(2001).
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2000 to 2009 using standard econometric techniques we describe in more detail
below. Our results are consistent with the managing function of the board,
although not to the exclusion of important monitoring benefits.
The accepted wisdom is that lawyers should steer clear of joining the board
of directors of a public company.98 The emphasis has been on the significant
costs arising from the dual role of counselor and director. A lawyer-director is
less able to objectively assess board actions in which she participates,99 and if
she is outside counsel, she also is less able to monitor and manage the senior
executives who pay her legal fees.100 Balanced against those costs are the
potential benefits of having a lawyer on the board—although, within the ac-
cepted wisdom, they are outweighed by the costs that a lawyer-director brings.101
We believe that rises in regulation and litigation102 have shifted that cost-
98. See ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 63–64; cf. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics &
Prof’l Responsibility, Lawyer Serving as Director of Client Corporation, Formal Op. 98–410 (Feb. 27,
1998), reprinted in COLLECTED FORMAL OPINIONS 1983–1998; N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l
Ethics, Op. 589 (1988).
99. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 13.7, at 739 (1986); ABA TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 1, at 36–38, 44–50; ABA Report and Recommendations, supra note 6, at 388–89;
John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in Lawyer Independence: Lawyer Equity
Investments in Clients, 81 TEX. L. REV. 405, 532 (2002) (discussing a potential conflict of interest);
Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and
Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 673–74 (1997); Simon M. Lorne, The Corporate and
Securities Adviser, the Public Interest, and Professional Ethics, 76 MICH. L. REV. 423, 491 (1978)
(“[M]anagement is pleased to list counsel as not being an employee or any sort of affiliate, but it views
him as an essentially captive director whose vote is reliably pro-management . . . .”); Martin Riger, The
Model Rules and Corporate Practice—New Ethics for a Competitive Era, 17 CONN. L. REV. 729, 743
(1985) (explaining what should happen when the lawyer-director’s position is in conflict with that of
the corporation); Potter Stewart, Professional Ethics for the Business Lawyer: The Morals of the Market
Place, 31 BUS. LAW. 463, 464 (1975). But see Albert, supra note 6, at 430 (arguing that the allegiances
of a lawyer and director “are largely consistent”).
100. See James D. Cox, The Paradoxical Corporate and Securities Law Implications of Counsel
Serving on the Client’s Board, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 541, 550–55 (2002); Martin Riger, The Lawyer-
Director—“A Vexing Problem,” 33 BUS. LAW. 2381, 2384–86 (1978). In addition, lawyer-directors are
held to a higher standard of conduct than nonlawyers, raising the risk of liability. See ABA TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 1, at 50–56. A lawyer-director may also find herself excluded under the corpora-
tion’s director and officer liability insurance policy and her firm’s malpractice insurance policy. See
Harris & Valihura, supra note 8, at 493–96. Her dual position also jeopardizes the firm’s ability to rely
on the attorney–client and work-product privileges in connection with any advice she provides. See
ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 44–50; ABA Report and Recommendations, supra note 6, at
389–90; Robert P. Cummins & Megyn M. Kelly, The Conflicting Roles of Lawyer as Director, 23 LITIG.
48, 49–50 (1996); Harris & Valihura, supra note 8, at 483–89.
101. See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text.
102. It is difficult to precisely measure the rise in regulation and litigation during the period, but
there are a number of ways to approximate the growth. The various measures suggest that regulation
and litigation were significant and increased from 2000 to 2009 (our observation period). Counting the
number of Federal Register pages provides an inexact measure of new federal regulation. During
2000–2009, the total number of Federal Register pages ranged between 64,438 and 79,435 annually.
See CLYDE WAYNE CREWS JR., TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS: AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF THE FEDERAL
REGULATORY STATE 14 (2010), available at http://cei.org/cei_files/fm/active/0/Wayne%20Crews%20-
%20Ten%20Thousand%20Commandments%20-%2010KC%20-%202010.pdf. More telling was the rela-
tive increase in Federal Register pages compared to prior decades. In 2000–2009, the total was 730,176
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benefit balance by contributing significantly to the benefits of having a lawyer
on the board.103 The board’s perceived sense of risk, even if it overstates actual
legal exposure, can also favor having a lawyer as a colleague.104 We also
believe that lawyer-directors provide significant monitoring benefits, adjusting a
CEO’s incentives to more closely align her interests with those of the firm.105
Importantly, the benefit of a lawyer-director is significant even after controlling
for the effects of outside directors. In other words, for the variables that we
consider below, the value provided by a lawyer-director is greater than the value
provided by a nonlawyer, outside director.106 As a result of the benefits, the
percentage of firms with lawyers on the board has risen substantially—from
24.5% in 2000 to 43.9% in 2009 (and topping at 47.5% in 2005)—as indicated
in Figure 1 below.107
Assessing the trend in lawyer-directors is difficult due to the limited avail-
ability of historical data and uncertainty over how they were compiled.108 The
number of lawyer-directors appears to have been significant during the 1970s
and early 1980s109 but may have dropped in the late 1980s and 1990s, perhaps
pages, a 17.3% increase over the 1990s (622,368 pages) and a 38.0% increase over the 1980s. See id. at
16. Using the Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”) as a measure, in 2010, the CFR contained 55%
more pages than in 1980, growing from 102,195 to 157,974 pages. See id. at 15. Moreover, as of 2010,
184 of the new federal regulations were classified as “economically significant”—meaning that the
relevant regulator estimated that the rule would have an annual economic effect of at least $100
million—a 34.3% increase over the preceding five years. See id. at 22. On the litigation front, between
2000 and 2009, the amounts annually budgeted by federal agencies to police regulatory compliance
rose by 70.8%, from $31.8 billion to $54.3 billion. See id. at 11. Surveys of in-house counsel of U.S.
and U.K. firms conducted in 2006–2010 showed that, in each year, between 22% and 40% of firms
expected the total number of legal disputes to increase over the coming twelve months. See FULBRIGHT
& JAWORSKI LLP, 7TH ANNUAL LITIGATION TRENDS SURVEY REPORT 10 (2010), available at http://
www.fulbright.com/images/publications/7thLitigationTrendsReport.pdf. From 2005 to 2010, more than
a quarter of the surveyed companies (the highest, in 2007, at 39%) reported they were involved in one
or more lawsuits with more than $20 million at stake. See id. at 15. During 2009 and 2010, 36% and
39% of surveyed firms with gross revenues of $1 billion or more reported the commencement of at least
one class action against them. See id. at 46. One reason for the rise in shareholder lawsuits may have
been increased competition among plaintiffs’ lawyers to pursue a wider range of lucrative corporate
claims. See Brian Cheffins et al., Delaware Corporate Litigation and the Fragmentation of the
Plaintiffs’ Bar, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 427, 466–79 (2012) (describing reasons for the increase in
corporate litigation rates after 2000).
103. See infra Table 6, Panel C, and accompanying text.
104. See Langevoort, supra note 96, at 823–24 (explaining why, under certain circumstances,
directors overestimate legal risk).
105. See infra Table 6, Panel B, and accompanying text.
106. This control, identified as OUTSIDE_DIRECTORS, is made for all tables in our study. In this
Article, for brevity, we present the control for OUTSIDE_DIRECTORS in Table 3, Panel A; Table 4;
and Table 6. Outcomes for the control in the remaining tables are on file with the authors.
107. Based on our sample, the number of lawyer-directors also grew during the period. See supra
note 16 and accompanying text.
108. See ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
109. A sizeable directory of lawyer-directors in public corporations during 1972–1974 appears in
OUTSIDE COUNSEL: INSIDER DIRECTOR, LAWYERS ON THE BOARDS OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 135–310 (William J.
Hudson, Jr. ed., 1974). A 1980 survey of proxy statements by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) found that 57.6% of the 1200 public firms analyzed included at least one lawyer on its board
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due to concerns over a lawyer-director’s heightened liability.110 One survey
indicated that the percentage of companies with outside counsel on the board
ranged from 19.4% in 1988 to 18% in 1991 and 17.5% in 1992,111 which is
roughly consistent with the 24.5% we observed in 2000.
A. DATA AND DATA SOURCES
We obtained data from several sources. For each of those sources, the
relevant observation period was 2000 to 2009.
Our main source was the BoardEx database, which includes data on indi-
vidual directors of 1500 U.S. public corporations comprising the S&P Com-
of directors. See SEC, DIV. OF CORP. FIN., STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, S. DOC. NO.
67–920, at 589–95, 601 (2d. Sess. 1980).
110. See supra note 100.
111. See ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.











Percentage of Outside Directors/Total Directors
Percentage of Firms with Lawyer-Directors
Percentage of Lawyer-Directors/Total Directors
Figure 1 shows the percentage of firms in our sample of public corporations which have lawyer-directors (middle
checkered line). It also shows (i) the percentage of outside directors as a share of all directors (solid line) and (ii) the
percentage of lawyer-directors as a share of all directors (bottom checkered line).
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posite 1500 Index (S&P 1500). We used those data, excluding financial
institutions,112 to define the main variable of our study, JDi,t, which is an
indicator variable for the presence of a lawyer-director.113 In order to identify
directors who received a legal education, we used the educational background
information provided by BoardEx. We also used BoardEx to compile employ-
ment history, personal information (such as gender, age, and law school alma
mater), board committee assignments, and director’s compensation.
In addition, we used the ExecuComp database, which includes data on
companies in the S&P 1500, to obtain information on executive incentives,
including CEO VEGAi,t
114 (CEO compensation tied to changes in stock value)
and CEO DELTAi,t (CEO compensation tied to changes in stock volatility),
CEO Salary, CEO Excess Compensation, and whether the CEO and board
chairman are the same person.
We used the Risk Metrics database in order to obtain data on each firm’s
governance features. In particular, we retrieved the Entrenchment Index (“E
Index”), which is a count index of provisions in corporate charters and by-laws
that provide protection against unsolicited takeovers such as classified boards
and poison pills.115
For litigation, we used the Audit Analytics litigation file for 2000–2010.
Included in that file was information on litigation, divided by categories of
lawsuits, with the most frequent categories being SECURITIES_LITi,t (securi-
ties law litigation), PATENT_LITi,t (patent litigation), CLASSACTION_LITi,t
(class action litigation), and ACCOUNTING_LITi,t (litigation relating to account-
ing malpractice). We also used the Audit Analytics litigation file to calculate an
estimated probability of litigation, identified as GENERAL_LITi,t, which is the
sum of the two principal litigation categories (securities law and class action
litigation) included in Audit Analytics. We also used the Audit Analytics
litigation file in calculating OPTION_BACKDATING_LITi,t (stock option back-
112. We excluded financial institutions principally for two reasons. First, financial firms tend to be
more regulated than nonfinancial firms. Consequently, the effect of governance on risk-taking or firm
value may be conditioned by external regulation. Second, empirical analysis that relates corporate
governance to firm performance often excludes measures of performance that are dependent on (or
related to) measures of indebtedness (such as, for example, returns on equity). Leverage in a financial
firm is fundamentally different from leverage in a nonfinancial firm, so including financial firms in the
data would distort the outcomes. Others have adopted the same empirical strategy. See, e.g., Güner et
al., supra note 93, at 326; David Yermack, Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board
of Directors, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 185, 189 (1996). Excluding financial institutions, the number of
companies in our data set ranged between 1205 and 1326 firms.
113. Directors who received one or more of the following degrees were considered to be lawyer-
directors: JD, LLB, LLM, Doctor of Jurisprudence. Within our sample, the highest number of law
degrees awarded to lawyer-directors were (in order) by: Harvard Law School, Columbia Law School,
Yale Law School, New York University School of Law, and University of Michigan Law School.
114. Unless otherwise defined, all initially capitalized terms and all terms entirely in capital letters
are defined in Appendix A.
115. For a description of the E Index, see infra note 210 and accompanying text.
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dating litigation).116
Finally, we used (i) the Option Metrics database to obtain information on
implied volatility, which we employed as a proxy for corporate risk,117 (ii) the
Compustat database to collect data on additional firm features, (iii) the Center
for Research in Security Prices (University of Chicago) database to calculate
firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q,118 and (iv) the Thomson Financial Dataset
to calculate institutional ownership, such as ownership by mutual funds, pen-
sion funds, hedge funds, insurance companies, and investment banks, as re-
ported on Form 13F at the end of the relevant fiscal year.119
116. The data comprising firms engaged in stock option backdating through September 4, 2007, is
derived from (i) the Wall Street Journal’s Options Scorecard, a comprehensive list of companies under
scrutiny for stock option grants and practices, see Options Scorecard, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, http://
online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-optionsscore06-full.html (last updated Sept. 4, 2007);
and (ii) Appendix I of Margarethe F. Wiersema and Yan Zhang’s Executive Turnover in the Stock Op-
tion Backdating Wave: The Impact of Social Context (Mar. 2011), available at http://muconf.missouri.
edu/corporate_governance/abstracts/Session%205%20-%20Zhang%20Conference%20Paper.pdf. Data af-
ter September 4, 2007, is based on a hand-collected review of announcements made by the SEC on its
website. See Spotlight on Stock Option Backdating, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/
optionsbackdating.htm (last updated Sept. 19, 2010).
117. See infra notes 258–59 and accompanying text.
118. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of a firm’s market value (defined as the firm’s total liabilities, minus its
balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credits, plus the value of its preferred stock and the
market value of its common stock) divided by the replacement cost of its assets. See Eugene F. Fama &
Kenneth R. French, Testing Trade-Off and Pecking Order Predictions About Dividends and Debt, 15
REV. FIN. STUD. 1, 8 (2002). The measure was introduced by James Tobin in A General Equilibrium
Approach to Monetary Theory, 1 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 15 (1969). Tobin’s Q has become a
commonly recognized proxy for market valuation because market prices reflect the marginal cost of
capital, which is reflected in the Tobin’s Q measure. See, e.g., Philip G. Berger & Eli Ofek,
Diversification’s Effect on Firm Value, 37 J. FIN. ECON. 39, 40 (1995); Larry H. P. Lang & René M.
Stulz, Tobin’s q, Corporate Diversification, and Firm Performance, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1248, 1249–50
(1994); Randall Morck et al., Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis,
20 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 294 (1988); Yermack, supra note 112, at 186. One major advantage of Tobin’s Q
is its computational simplicity. All of its determinants are retrievable from existing data sources such as,
for example, the Compustat database. Tobin’s Q, however, is not without its critics. First, market prices
do not necessarily reflect the marginal cost of capital, but instead may reflect the average cost of capital.
In that case, firm value may not be properly captured by Tobin’s Q. See Joao Gomes, Financing
Investment, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1263, 1264–65 (2001); see also Eric B. Lindenberg & Stephen A. Ross,
Tobin’s q Ratio and Industrial Organization, 54 J. BUS. 1, 8–9 (1981). Second, Tobin’s Q may not
reflect an accurate valuation of the firm due to market irrationality. Irrationality could be significant if
investor sentiment drives valuations in the stock market. See Malcolm Baker et al., When Does the
Market Matter? Stock Prices and the Investment of Equity-Dependent Firms, 118 Q.J. ECON. 969, 969
(2003). With those caveats in mind, Tobin’s Q is still a commonly accepted measure of firm valuation,
including within the scholarship on corporate governance. See, e.g., Paul Gompers et al., Corporate
Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 126 (2003).
119. All institutional investment managers with more than $100 million under discretionary manage-
ment are required to disclose certain of their holdings in U.S. stocks and other securities to the SEC
each quarter on Form 13F. The information on Form 13F covers long positions greater than 10,000
shares or $200,000 over which the manager exercises sole or shared investment discretion. Short
positions and derivatives are not required to be disclosed. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 13(f)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f) (2006); Form 13F, 17 C.F.R. § 249.325 (2012).
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B. PREDICTING LAWYER-DIRECTORS
Lawyer-directors are more likely to be men, sixty-three years old, and outside
directors (not employed by the company) who participate on two public com-
pany boards and, within each board, are members of three or four committees.
About one-fourth of lawyer-directors are members, respectively, of the audit
and nominating (or governance) committees, and about one-third are members,
respectively, of the compensation and risk management committees. In 7% of
the boards, the lawyer-director is also chairman; in 9%, he is the audit commit-
tee chair; in 14%, he is the compensation and/or risk committee chair; and in
27% he is the nominating (or governance) committee chair. A lawyer-director’s
average compensation is $177,000 per year, of which over 60% is tied to the
company’s common stock.120
We begin our analysis in Table 1 below by determining whether there are
particular firm characteristics that are more likely to result in having a lawyer on
the board. Using a determinant model,121 we assessed the likelihood of having a
lawyer-director against a number of predetermined firm characteristics. We used
predetermined variables in order to assess their impact, as existing firm character-
istics, on the prospective likelihood of having a lawyer-director.122 We expected
firms with a high estimated likelihood of litigation, GENERAL_LITi,t1, to have
lawyers on the board because lawyer-directors may bring special expertise in
managing complex lawsuits to which the company is subject.123 Larger firms
are also more likely to have lawyer-directors due to their greater organizational
complexity (as evidenced by a larger number of operating segments, COM-
PLEXITYi,t1, and a higher amount of total assets, SIZEi,t1), as well as the
likelihood of greater public and regulatory scrutiny.124 We also expected firms
listed on the NYSE to be more likely to have lawyer-directors due to the
NYSE’s listing requirements for independent directors125 and the higher levels
120. The data in this paragraph are all derived from Appendix B, Panel B.
121. The models that underlie the tables in Parts II, III, and IV of this Article are available from the
authors on request.
122. Predetermining (lagging) a variable is a standard econometric technique that attempts to make
the variable more exogenous to the determination of the independent variable (in this case, the like-
lihood of having a lawyer-director).
123. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. In order to minimize concerns over endogeneity with
respect to GENERAL_LITi,t1 and JDi,t, we also considered specifications where GENERAL_LITi,t was
lagged over two or three periods. The significance of the variable was inflated in those cases, consistent
with the expectation that including a lawyer-director reflects her litigation expertise. More importantly,
this finding confirmed our expectations in the null hypothesis—larger and more complex firms listed on
the NYSE or in industries with a higher degree of litigation are more likely to have a lawyer on the
board.
124. See Agrawal & Knoeber, supra note 81, at 183–85 (describing the effect of size on political
oversight).
125. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. Firms listed on the NYSE are subject, among
other laws, to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006 & Supp. IV), which has
increased the presence of lawyers and other outsiders on boards of directors. See infra note 130 and
accompanying text.
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of corporate governance regulation—and related litigation—to which public
companies are subject.126 Finally, we considered the effect of institutional share
ownership by investment managers with more than $100 million under discretion-
ary management, INSTITUTIONAL OWNi,t1, on having a lawyer-director. We
considered the possibility that higher levels of institutional ownership could
affect how a company is operated, as well as the composition of its board.127
In addition, we included several variables, outside of firm characteristics, that
could influence the selection of a lawyer-director. We included an indicator
variable, SOXt, equal to one in the period following enactment of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”).128 Although aspects of board structure changed
prior to SOX’s passage,129 the Act had a dramatic effect on corporate boards,
their activities, and their costs.130 Following SOX, the makeup of the director
pool also changed, increasing the likelihood of lawyers, financial experts, aca-
demics, and retired executives becoming directors.131 Also included was a vari-
able that captured the propensity of other firms in the same industry to include
lawyers on their boards, INDUSTRY JDi,t1.
132 Due to an industry’s particular
characteristics (such as increased regulation), we anticipated that firms in some
industries would benefit more than firms in others by having a lawyer on the
board.133 Finally, we included an indicator variable, JD NETWORKi,t1, equal
to one if at least one director was a member of another board that included a
lawyer-director.134 Consistent with other examples of overlapping boards shar-
ing knowledge, we expected directors who sit on more than one board, and who
find a lawyer-director to be valuable, to share those experiences with others.135
126. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Governance and U.S. Capital Market Competitiveness
6–31 (UCLA School of Law, Working Paper No. 10-13, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract1696303 (discussing the massive growth in corporate and securities litigation risk and the
increasing cost and complexity of U.S. regulation).
127. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 25, at 995–1013 (describing increased activism among
institutional shareholders and the resulting changes in board organization).
128. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006 & Supp. IV). Note that SOX was
partially effective in 2003, and most of its provisions were effective by 2004. This indicator variable,
therefore, is coded as equal to one in the period starting with 2004.
129. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 25, at 1026–27.
130. See James S. Linck et al., The Effects and Unintended Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
on the Supply and Demand for Directors, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3287, 3289–90 (2009).
131. See id. at 3290.
132. Note that, in order to avoid a mechanical positive correlation, this variable is calculated for
each firm to exclude that firm’s propensity to have a lawyer-director.
133. See Agrawal & Knoeber, supra note 81, at 185 (finding that the importance of having directors
with political experience varies by industry).
134. Variables (i)–(iii) are exclusive, since their effect on the choice of having a lawyer-director
occurs through channels that are distinct from the channels that influence the dependent variables
(risk-taking, CEO compensation, firm value, and other mechanisms of corporate governance) to be
separately investigated.
135. See Gerald F. Davis, Agents Without Principles? The Spread of the Poison Pill Through the
Intercorporate Network, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 583, 592–94, 607–08 (1991) (finding that interlocking
boards provided one means for companies to communicate an innovation’s value to others); James D.
Westphal & Edward J. Zajac, Defections from the Inner Circle: Social Exchange, Reciprocity, and the
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Although some firm characteristics can be codetermined with having a lawyer-
director, variables such as SOX, the firm’s industry, and director networks are
purely exogenous determinants.
In Table 1, we controlled for various categories of litigation propensity.
Those included the probability of a firm being engaged in patent litigation,
PATENT_LITi,t1, the probability of litigation relating to the securities laws,
SECURITIES_LITi,t1, the probability of class action litigation, CLASS
ACTION_LITi,t1, and the probability of litigation relating to accounting mal-
practice, ACCOUNTING_LITi,t1.
Our main findings were consistent with our expectations—namely, that each
determinant was a predictor of having a lawyer on the board—except that
institutional share ownership, INSTITUTIONAL OWNi,t1, was not economi-
cally significant.
Turning to economic significance, based on Model (2) of Table 1,138 we
found:
● A one standard deviation increase in the probability of litigation,
GENERAL_LITi,t1, is associated with a 2.2% standard deviation in-
crease in the probability of having a lawyer on the board, JDi,t.
139
Examining the four litigation categories, we also found that a one
standard deviation increase in the probability of patent litigation,
PATENT_LITi,t1, is associated with a 3.6% increase in JDi,t.
140
Diffusion of Board Independence in U.S. Corporations, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 161, 162–63, 173–81 (1997)
(explaining the diffusion of corporate governance changes, where CEOs become subject to closer board
control, through the influence of CEOs from one company being on the boards of other companies).
136. In this table and this Article’s other tables, we report in parentheses the t-statistics associated
with the test of the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficient is statistically different from zero. The
analytical description of the regression models underlying this table and the other tables in this Article
are online at http://georgetownlawjournal.org/articles/lawyers-and-fools/.
137. The original classification of forty-eight industries in Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French,
Industry Costs of Equity, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 153, 179–81 (1997), has been updated to forty-nine
industries. See Kenneth R. French, Changes in Industry Specifications, DARTMOUTH C. (Feb. 9, 2013),
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/changes_ind.html. Excluded from
our sample are all financial firms: banking, insurance, real estate, and financial trading. See supra note
112.
138. We present our economic significance estimates from Model (2) of Table 1 (rather than
Model (1) of Table 1) because the estimates in Model (2) (a linear model) are marginal effects, whereas
those shown in Model (1) (a nonlinear model) are not.
139. This amount is calculated as (a) the coefficient estimate of GENERAL_LITi,t1 (0.031) in
Model (2), multiplied by (b) one standard deviation in GENERAL_LITi,t1 (0.29, as set out in
Appendix B, Panel A), divided by (c) the unconditional probability of having a lawyer-director (the
average of JDi,t, 0.41, as set out in Appendix B, Panel A).
140. This amount is calculated as (a) the coefficient estimate of PATENT_LITi,t1 (0.053) in
Model (3), multiplied by (b) one standard deviation in PATENT_LITi,t1 (0.28, as set out in Appendix
B, Panel A), divided by (c) the unconditional probability of having a lawyer-director (the average of
JDi,t, 0.41, as set out in Appendix B, Panel A).
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● A one standard deviation increase in the SIZEi,t1 of a company is
associated with a nearly 18.4% increase in JDi,t.
141
● For companies listed on the NYSE, JDi,t increases by 44.6%.
142
● A one standard deviation increase in COMPLEXITYi,t1, as evidenced
141. This amount is calculated as (a) the coefficient estimate of SIZEi,t1 (0.047) in Model (2),
multiplied by (b) one standard deviation in SIZEi,t1 (1.603, as set out in Appendix B, Panel A), divided
by (c) the unconditional probability of having a lawyer-director (the average of JDi,t, 0.41, as set out in
Appendix B, Panel A).
142. This amount is calculated as the coefficient estimate of NYSE-Listedi,t1 (0.183) divided
by the unconditional probability of having a lawyer-director (the average of JDi,t, 0.41, as set out in
Appendix B, Panel A).
Table 1. Predictive Regression for the Choice of a Lawyer-Director.136
Dependent Variable: JDi,t






























































































Observations 8,466 8,466 8,466 8,466 8,466 8,466
Pseudo R-squared 9.4% - - - - -
Adj. R-squared - 12.5% 8.8% 8.7% 8.6% 8.7%
Table 1 sets out the determinants of having a lawyer-director on the board of a U.S. public nonfinancial corporation.
Model (1) is a Probit model (and shows actual, as opposed to marginal, effects), whereas Models (2) through (6) are linear
probability models. Regressions included controls for year and industry fixed effects (industry is defined using the
Fama-French 49 industry portfolios, excluding financial firms).137 Adjusted R-squared and Pseudo R-squared are measures of
model goodness of fit. The ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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by a larger number of operating segments, is associated with a 1.8%
standard deviation increase in JDi,t.
143
A company is also more likely to have a lawyer on the board when other
firms in the same industry have a lawyer-director and when one or more
existing directors serve on another board with a lawyer-director.
● A one standard deviation increase in INDUSTRY JDi,t1 (the propensity
of firms in the same industry to include lawyers on their boards) is
associated with a 14.7% standard deviation increase in the probability of
having a lawyer-director, JDi,t.
144
● An increase by one standard deviation in JD NETWORKi,t1 (the
likelihood of a director being a member of another board that includes a
lawyer-director) is associated with a 7% increase in JDi,t.
145
Generally speaking, the firm characteristics that predict whether a lawyer
is on the board can be divided into two categories. In the first category are
internal characteristics, such as a firm’s size, complexity, and decision to list on
the NYSE. Those internal characteristics—over which the company has some
control—are likely to also result in the board including a lawyer-director.
In the second category are external pressures, such as greater litigation and
regulation, over which the board has less control. Board composition can evolve
in line with changes in the environment in which its business is conducted, with
the likelihood of a lawyer-director increasing when it benefits the board to have
a colleague with legal training or when other boards add a lawyer-director. With
respect to patents, a lawyer-director may be particularly valuable in protecting,
realizing, and leveraging the value of the firm’s intangible assets.146
In both cases—greater complexity and rising litigation—directors are more
likely to become more closely involved in developing a company’s business
strategy, consistent with the board’s managing function.147
143. This amount is calculated as (a) the coefficient estimate of COMPLEXITYi,t1 (0.006) in
Model (2), multiplied by (b) one standard deviation in COMPLEXITYi,t1 (1.23, as set out in
Appendix B, Panel A), divided by (c) the unconditional probability of having a lawyer-director (the
average of JDi,t, 0.41, as set out in Appendix B, Panel A).
144. This amount is calculated as (a) the coefficient of INDUSTRY JDi,t1 (0.437) in Model (2),
multiplied by (b) one standard deviation in INDUSTRY JDi,t1 (0.138, as set out in Appendix B,
Panel A), divided by (c) the unconditional probability of having a lawyer-director (the average of JDi,t,
0.41, as set out in Appendix B, Panel A).
145. This amount is calculated as (a) the coefficient estimate of JD NETWORKi,t1 (0.11), multi-
plied by (b) one standard deviation in JD NETWORKi,t1 (0.26, as set out in Appendix B, Panel A),
divided by (c) the unconditional probability of having a lawyer-director (the average of JDi,t, 0.41, as
set out in Appendix B, Panel A).
146. See Bagley, supra note 27, at 385–86.
147. See William Q. Judge, Jr. & Carl P. Zeithaml, Institutional and Strategic Choice Perspectives
on Board Involvement in the Strategic Decision Process, 35 ACAD. MGMT. J. 766, 786 (1992).
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C. CONCERNS WITH ENDOGENEITY
In Parts III and IV, we consider the effect of a lawyer-director on CEO pay,
board structure and takeover protections, board integrity, corporate risk-taking,
and firm value. Before doing so, it may be worthwhile to first address potential
endogeneity concerns around our results. Endogeneity, in this context, refers to
the possibility that changes in dependent variables correlate with the presence of
a lawyer-director, but may not be caused by having a lawyer-director (a
“specification problem”), or that the changes may be the cause of why a lawyer
is on the board rather than the other way around (a “simultaneity problem”).148
If either is true, the regression model we employ and the estimates we obtain
may not be reliable.149
To address those concerns, we employed an instrumental variable analysis
through a two-stage least squares (“2SLS”) regression.150 In the first stage, we
predicted the key independent variable, JDi,t, that we suspected could be
endogenous, using the analysis performed in Model (1) of Table 1. The predic-
tion of JDi,t relied on two sets of independent variables. The first set included
GENERAL_LITi,t1, SIZEi,t1, NYSE-Listedi,t1, COMPLEXITYi,t1, and
INSTITUTIONAL OWNi,t1. The second set was composed of excluded (or
distinct) instrumental variables that we assumed would influence JDi,t but would
not influence the applicable dependent variable. Those excluded variables were:
the enactment of SOX (SOXt); the propensity of other firms in the same
industry to have lawyer-directors (INDUSTRY JDi,t1); and, in any given year,
having at least one director sit on another board in the prior year that included a
lawyer-director (JD NETWORKi,t1).
151 Both sets of variables were predeter-
mined, meaning they existed at the time a lawyer-director joined the board.
Since they already existed, they were assumed to be exogenous—their existence
was not determined by the addition of the lawyer-director—and, therefore, they
could be used as instruments to predict whether a lawyer would be on the
board.152 Finally, in the first stage, we controlled for year and industry fixed
effects.
In the second stage, we used the value of JDi,t predicted from the first stage
148. See Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime” Hypoth-
esis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1255–56 (2003).
149. See WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 227–28 (7th ed. 2012).
150. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND PANEL DATA 89–90
(2d ed. 2010) (discussing 2SLS regressions and the diagnostic tests used to determine whether
instrumental variables are correctly selected).
151. Excluded instrumental variables are used to identify distinctive factors that determine the
inclusion of lawyers on the board. The factors are distinctive if they explain the choice to include a
lawyer-director but are unrelated to the dependent variable being studied (in this case, CEO compen-
sation). Those instrumental variables (SOXt, INDUSTRY JDi,t1, and JD NETWORKi,t1) are valid
because (x) they are relevant to influencing the appointment of a lawyer-director, and (y) they are
exclusive because their effect on having a lawyer-director occurs through channels that are distinct
from the channels that influence the dependent variables. We make similar assumptions regarding
relevance and exclusivity of the above instruments for the rest of our empirical analyses.
152. Predetermined variables were also included in the rest of our empirical analyses.
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(lagged by one period, and referred to as Predicted JDi,t1) and related this
variable to each of the dependent variables. Our empirical results using Pre-
dicted JDi,t1 confirmed that our instrumental variable analysis properly ad-
dressed the endogeneity concern.153
As part of the 2SLS regression, we assumed that the excluded variables—
SOXt, INDUSTRY JDi,t1, and JD NETWORKi,t1—would influence JDi,t but
would not directly influence the dependent variables. There may, however, be a
concern with this assumption: the possibility that one or more excluded vari-
ables, in fact, directly affected one or more of the dependent variables. For
example, SOXt could directly affect CEO compensation (a dependent variable),
rather than indirectly affecting CEO compensation through the presence of a
lawyer-director, Predicted JDi,t1. To verify the treatment, we removed SOXt
from the list of excluded instruments and we controlled the regression explicitly
for SOXt. Our results remained unchanged; the impact of Predicted JDi,t1 on
the dependent variables was the same. This was due to our specifications also
including a control for year fixed effects. SOXt was defined as a dummy
variable equal to 1 after 2002 and 0 otherwise. Including this annual fixed effect
absorbed a substantial part of the direct effect of SOXt on the dependent
variables. Consequently, the coefficient of Predicted JDi,t1 explained the mar-
ginal incidence of having a lawyer-director on the dependent variables. We also
controlled each of our other regressions for year fixed effects. This meant that
any direct effect that SOXt could have on a dependent or interacting variable
was largely absorbed by the year control.
The industry variable, INDUSTRY JDi,t1, could have a quasi-industry fixed
effect, meaning that (like SOXt) it could directly influence one or more of our
dependent variables. To address this concern, we controlled for industry fixed
effects (using the Fama-French 49 industry categories) in our predictive model
(Table 1). After controlling for the Fama-French categories, INDUSTRY
JDi,t1 still had a positive and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of
having a lawyer-director. From this result, we concluded that, at the margin,
INDUSTRY JDi,t1 was relevant to explaining when a lawyer is on the board.
We controlled our other regressions using the Fama-French 49 industry catego-
ries. This meant that any direct effect that INDUSTRY JDi,t1 could have on a
dependent or interacting variable was largely absorbed by the Fama-French 49
industry controls.
To verify our results, we also removed INDUSTRY JDi,t1 from the list of
excluded instruments where INDUSTRY JDi,t1 could affect the dependent
variables. The results were substantially unchanged. The explanation here paral-
lels the earlier reasoning for SOXt. The Fama-French 49 industry controls
absorbed a substantial portion of the effect of INDUSTRY JDi,t1. Thus, like
SOXt, the coefficient of Predicted JDi,t1 explained the marginal incidence of
153. We also used Predicted JDi,t1 to address endogeneity concerns in the rest of our empirical
analyses.
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having a lawyer-director on the dependent variables once the Fama-French 49
controls were taken into account.
We did not expect JD NETWORKi,t1 to directly influence our dependent
variables, although it was possible the network could have had some effect
independent of whether a lawyer was on the board. Our ability to exclude JD
NETWORKi,t1 was confirmed, however, because the residuals of the first-stage
regression, where we regressed JD NETWORKi,t1 against JDi,t, were uncorre-
lated with the dependent variables in all the second-stage regressions (including
CEO compensation, risk-taking, and firm value).
The endogeneity concerns were also addressed in a first-difference regression
on the relationship between a lawyer-director and our two major dependent
variables: firm risk-taking and value.154 The principal concern was that firm
characteristics, other than those controls identified in our regressions, could
drive the relationship with those variables. Through a first-difference regression,
we could test whether there was an idiosyncratic feature of the firm that
codetermined the dependent and independent variables. Ultimately, the first-
difference method allowed us to test the isolated effect a lawyer-director has on
firm risk-taking and value. Consistent with all our regressions, we also predeter-
mined the independent variable (JDi,t1) by lagging it by one period. In this
way, we could observe (on average at an individual firm level) whether the
change in having a lawyer-director from year one to year two, for example,
affected the change in risk-taking and firm value from years two to three. This
model confirmed our hypothesis that the presence of a lawyer-director had a
causal effect on firm risk-taking and value. The results of the regression were
also consistent with the other causal claims we make in this Article.155
* * *
In the next two Parts, we consider what happens after a lawyer joins the
board. Part III describes the effect of a lawyer-director on board monitoring,
CEO incentives, and the shareholders’ ability to influence board action. None of
154. Our formal robustness analysis appears in Appendix C.
155. In order to strengthen our robustness checks, we substituted industry fixed effects with firm
fixed effects in the 2SLS analysis. This required us to control for firm effects in the first-stage and
second-stage regressions. Since our first-stage regression is nonlinear (a Probit model), the estimation is
biased due to an incidental parameter problem—the problem of biased estimates in nonlinear panel data
models with fixed effects that have less than ten degrees of freedom per effect, as described in
J. Neyman & Elizabeth L. Scott, Consistent Estimates Based on Partially Consistent Observations,
16 ECONOMETRICA 1, 1–3 (1948). We estimated nearly 1300 firm indicators with less than 10,000
observations, so we had approximately seven degrees of freedom per firm indicator. Consequently, we
implemented a model with random effects as an alternative to firm fixed effects, following the strategy
suggested by William Greene in Fixed Effects and Bias Due to the Incidental Parameters Problem in
the Tobit Model, 23 ECONOMETRIC REVS. 125, 131 (2004). We found that all of the second-stage results
are, on average, economically stronger and statistically unchanged. We also obtained similar statistical
and economic results in all of our second-stage regressions when we used, as the first-stage regression
model, Model 2 in Table 1 (the linear probability model). Because the first-stage model was linear, we
were able to control for firm fixed effects without concern for the incidental parameter problem
discussed above.
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those is a firm characteristic that determines the presence of a lawyer-director,
but each is affected by having a lawyer participate in board oversight and
decision making. In Part IV, we consider the impact of a lawyer-director on
risk-taking and firm value. Part of the effect is tied to firm characteristics that
predict having a lawyer-director—in particular, the influence on board composi-
tion of litigation and regulation—and part is related to the role of a lawyer-
director in monitoring firm performance.
III. LAWYERS, MONITORING, AND INCENTIVES
The traditional monitoring model focuses on incentives156 that help align the
interests of directors and managers with those of the firm—principally its ability
to access low-cost equity capital, partly by minimizing agency costs.157 Those
incentives can be explicit, by directly tying board and manager compensation to
a firm’s results, or implicit, for directors, through the threat of removal by the
shareholders, and for managers, through concern over being fired by the board.158
Explicit and implicit incentives can be substitutes and complements.159 For
example, in an optimal incentive contract, the implicit incentives tied to an
officer’s career concerns should decline as the officer nears retirement, while
the explicit incentives—tying current pay to current performance—should substi-
tute in their place.160 Alternatively, the CEO of a financially constrained firm
may be forced to make incentive concessions in order to raise new funds. She
may be willing, as complements, to accept a lower level of performance-based
compensation, as well as the greater risk of losing her job if she performs
poorly.161 In each case, the extent to which incentives are substitutes or comple-
ments varies with the circumstances of the officer and the company, making it
difficult to assess how changes in any one incentive interact with the others.162
In this Part, we examine the effect of a lawyer-director on both types of
incentives. We start by considering changes in CEO compensation, an explicit
incentive, whose effect on firm performance is likely to be tied to the risk-
taking it encourages.163 For implicit incentives, we consider changes in board
156. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
157. See Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Boards of Directors: In Principle and in Practice, 24 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 247, 250 (2008).
158. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 20 (2006).
159. See id. at 26–27.
160. See Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control
Agency Problems Between Managers and Shareholders, 31 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 377, 377–
78 (1996) (discussing the mechanisms through which firms can reduce the agency problems that arise
when managers have incentives to pursue their own interests at the expense of the shareholders); Robert
Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory
and Evidence, 100 J. POL. ECON. 468, 469–70 (1992).
161. See TIROLE, supra note 158, at 26.
162. See id. at 378–79. Nevertheless, we are able to analyze infra in Part IV the overall effect on
firm risk-taking and value of having a lawyer-director.
163. See infra notes 170–78 and accompanying text.
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structure (such as board size and whether the CEO is also board chairman) and
takeover protections (such as the addition of a poison pill or classified board)
that can affect board monitoring and the likelihood of the CEO being fired.164
We also consider the extent to which a lawyer-director affects board integrity—
the board’s conducting itself in an honest manner, in particular in relation to
public financial disclosure—using litigation around stock option backdating as a
proxy. Accurate disclosure is particularly important because it makes clear the
type of compensation the CEO has received and, more generally, it provides
valuable information to shareholders who can assess firm and managerial
performance.165 We wait until Part IV to consider the effect of a lawyer-director
on firm risk-taking and value, partly arising from the changes in incentives we
analyze below.
A. CEO COMPENSATION
Few areas of corporate governance scholarship have received as much atten-
tion as executive compensation. Managers generally are more risk averse than
shareholders,166 who can diversify away firm-specific risks—such as a drop in
performance—that a manager, whose reputation and human capital are tied to
the firm, would potentially bear.167 A manager who is paid a salary and a
pension also becomes a creditor of the firm, with limited upside and the
potential loss of her investment if the firm becomes insolvent.168 Shareholders
face different risks: the loss of their investment if the firm is bankrupt, but
unlimited returns if the firm succeeds.169
There is a well-developed body of scholarship on the use of compensation to
link executive and shareholder interests.170 Within a manager’s pay package, the
incentive component—typically stock or stock options, but more recently, an
array of instruments171—is intended to align the interests of senior managers
164. See infra notes 203–20 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 228–29 and accompanying text.
166. See David I. Walker, The Law and Economics of Executive Compensation: Theory and
Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 232, 236–37 (Claire A. Hill &
Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2011).
167. See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options,
90 AM. ECON. REV. 209, 210 (2000).
168. See Kelli A. Alces & Brian D. Galle, The False Promise of Risk-Reducing Incentive Pay:
Evidence from Executive Pensions and Deferred Compensation, 38 J. CORP. L. 53, 57 (2012).
169. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 256
(2010).
170. See generally Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?,
113 Q.J. ECON. 653 (1998) (analyzing the relationship between firm performance and CEO compensa-
tion generated by changes in the value of CEO holdings of stock and stock options); Bengt Holmström,
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 169 (1999) (studying the
“implicit contract” that links today’s performance to future wages).
171. See David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay,
51 B.C. L. REV. 435, 448–49 (2010).
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and shareholders172 by giving managers direct financial incentives to take on the
risks shareholders would prefer and rewarding managers for increases in firm
value.173 Often, however, executive incentives are blamed for promoting exces-
sive risk-taking174—perhaps a breakdown in the “optimal contracting” model of
compensation, which argues that incentives are the product of arm’s-length
bargaining between directors and managers,175 or a reflection of the “manage-
rial power” view of compensation, which argues that CEOs and other execu-
tives influence how they are paid, potentially to the detriment of shareholders
and the firm.176 As equity-based pay has grown,177 a key to the inquiry has been
whether particular incentives motivate senior managers to maximize short-term
gains—by pursuing riskier projects, potentially at the expense of future profits—
or improve corporate performance in a way that can be sustained over a longer
period of time.178
In this Part, we consider the effect of a lawyer-director on CEO compensation
tied to changes in the value of a company’s common stock, CEO DELTAi,t, and
changes in the volatility of a company’s common stock, CEO VEGAi,t. Delta
refers to the sensitivity of an option’s value to changes in the underlying asset
price. CEO compensation tied to a firm’s delta, therefore, is sensitive to changes
in firm value, which is likely to reduce a CEO’s risk-taking incentives.179 Vega
172. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 353–54 (1976); Michael C. Jensen &
Kevin Murphy, Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 242–53
(1990).
173. See Walker, supra note 166, at 236–38.
174. See Walker, supra note 171, at 435–36 (explaining the complaint that executive compensation
is insufficiently focused on the long term, which leads to reckless short-term decision making).
175. See John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?,
103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1160–62 (2005).
176. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 753–54 (2002); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J.
Jackson, Jr., Executive Pensions, 30 J. CORP. L. 823, 829–31 (2005) (considering three explanations for
the use of pensions as an efficient form of executive pay: favorable tax treatment, shifting the risk of
poor investment performance to the company, and aligning the interests of executives and debtholders);
Core et al., supra note 175, at 1142–43 (arguing that the boards of public companies are beholden to the
firm’s top management because of management control over the director nomination process); Richard A.
Lambert et al., The Structure of Organizational Incentives, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 438, 441–42 (1993).
177. See Hall & Liebman, supra note 170, at 682–83 (arguing that, because the board is unwilling
to reduce CEO pay for poor performance, salary has a weak relation to firm performance and therefore
equity-based pay is the only feasible way to create incentives); Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive
Compensation: Managerial Power Versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847,
847–48 (2002).
178. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues,
20 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 5, 8 (2006); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensa-
tion: Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. REG. 359, 363 (2009) (positing that,
instead of stock and stock options, incentive compensation plans should consist only of restricted stock
and restricted stock options); see also Walker, supra note 171, at 439–44 (examining possible
explanations for corporate boards’ emphasis on short-term gains at the expense of long-term profits).
179. See Jeffrey L. Coles et al., Managerial Incentives and Risk Taking, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 461
(2006).
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refers to the sensitivity of a stock option’s price to changes in share price
volatility.180 As shares become more volatile, indicating an increase in company
risk, CEO compensation with a positive vega will increase in value.181 CEO
compensation that is positively tied to a firm’s vega, therefore, can increase a
CEO’s risk-taking incentives.
Table 2, Panel A, sets out our study of the impact of lawyer-directors on CEO
incentives—CEO DELTAi,t and CEO VEGAi,t. Our main independent variable
in those regressions was the presence of a lawyer-director. To capture this, we
used (i) the indicator variable JDi,t1 in Models (1) and (7); (ii) Predicted JDi,t1
in Models (2) and (8); (iii) an indicator variable if the lawyer-director is a
nonexecutive, JD_OUTSIDEi,t1, in Models (3) and (9); (iv) an indicator
variable if the lawyer-director is also the board’s chairman, JD_CHAIRMA-
Ni,t1, in Models (4) and (10); (v) an indicator variable if a lawyer-director sits
on the board’s compensation committee, JD_COMPCOMi,t1, in Models (5)
and (11); and (vi) an indicator variable if a lawyer-director is the compensation
committee chairman, JD_CHAIR_COMPCOMi,t1, in Models (6) and (12). We
also controlled for those variables that appear in the predictive model in
Table 1, such as year and industry fixed effects, NYSE-Listedi,t1, SIZEi,t1,
AVSALESGROWTHi,t1 (average sales growth), DIVIDENDSi,t1 (dividend
payouts), CASHi,t1 (cash reserves), and OUTSIDE_DIRECTORSi,t1 (propor-
tion of outside directors on the board).182 Those are important controls in
regression models to determine CEO incentives because they capture firm
performance, which can be an important determinant of CEO pay.183
Our main findings in Table 2, Panel A are that the presence of a lawyer-
director is associated with executive incentives that are more aligned with
long-term shareholder interests, meaning that executive pay is less sensitive to
firm volatility. In addition, the more prominent the lawyer-director is on the
board, the greater the directional effect on CEO incentives.
Our main findings in Table 2, Panel A, are the following:
● We found that the presence of a lawyer-director, JDi,t1, is associated
with weaker risk-taking incentives. Lawyer-directors are associated with
higher CEO DELTAi,t and lower CEO VEGAi,t.
● The effect of a lawyer-director on CEO incentives is stronger if her
position on the board is more prominent—specifically, if a lawyer-
180. See id.
181. See David I. Walker, Evolving Executive Equity Compensation and the Limits of Optimal
Contracting, 64 VAND. L. REV. 609, 620–21 (2011).
182. We also considered INSTITUTIONAL OWNi,t1 (percentage of stock held by institutional
investment managers), but did not include it as a formal control because it was statistically insignifi-
cant.
183. See John Core & Wayne Guay, Estimating the Value of Employee Stock Option Portfolios and
Their Sensitivities to Price and Volatility, 40 J. ACCT. RES. 613, 614–15 (2002).
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director is the chairman of the board or sits on the compensation
committee.
● As noted earlier,184 our results on the impact of a lawyer-director on
CEO incentives are not affected by the possible endogeneity of having a
lawyer on the board. In Panel A, Model (2), we show the same qualita-
tive results using Predicted JDi,t1.
● As a robustness check, we obtained the same qualitative results as
Panel A when we performed a first-difference regression of CEO DEL-
TAi,t and CEO VEGAi,t against JDi,t1.
185
Turning to the economic significance of the results, we found:
● Based on the estimates in Table 2, Panel A, the presence of a lawyer-
director increases CEO DELTAi,t by 3.1%
186 and decreases CEO VEGAi,t
by 9.3.%.187
● Similar effects are shown in Table 2, Panel A, for alternative measures
of a lawyer-director’s participation on the board. For example, if the
lawyer-director also serves as board chairman, the increase in CEO
DELTAi,t is 10.5%
188 and the decrease in CEO VEGAi,t is 13.9%.
189
The effect on CEO incentives is even greater if we use Predicted JDi,t1
rather than JDi,t1. For example, a one standard deviation increase in Predicted
JDi,t1 leads to a 12.4% increase in CEO DELTAi,t
190 and a 15% decrease in
CEO VEGAi,t.
191
In Panel B below, we relate lawyer-directors to CEO Salary and CEO Excess
Compensation.192 In those regressions, following the same format as in Panel A,
184. See supra notes 148–55 and accompanying text.
185. The results of this robustness check are on file with the authors.
186. This amount is equal to the coefficient estimate of 15.4 appearing in Panel A, Model (1),
divided by average CEO DELTAi,t of 497 (as set out in Appendix B, Panel A).
187. This amount is equal to the coefficient estimate of 6.4 appearing in Panel A, Model (7),
divided by average CEO VEGAi,t of 69 (as set out in Appendix B, Panel A).
188. This amount is equal to the coefficient estimate of 52.2 appearing in Panel A, Model (4),
divided by average CEO DELTAi,t of 497 (as set out in Appendix B, Panel A).
189. This amount is equal to the coefficient estimate of 9.6 appearing in Panel A, Model (10),
divided by average CEO VEGAi,t of 69 (as set out in Appendix B, Panel A).
190. This amount is equal to (a) the coefficient estimate of 332 appearing in Panel A, Model (2),
multiplied by (b) 1 standard deviation in Predicted JDi,t1 of 0.179, divided by (c) average CEO
DELTAi,t of 497 (as set out in Appendix B, Panel A).
191. This amount is equal to (a) the coefficient estimate of 58 appearing in Panel A, Model (8),
multiplied by (b) one standard deviation in Predicted JDi,t1 of 0.179, divided by (c) average CEO
VEGAi,t of 69 (as set out in Appendix B, Panel A).
192. Our sample sizes differ across the various tabulations. This is primarily the result of differences
in the availability of data on the control variables or the excluded instruments. A particular problem
here is that data on the instrumental variable JD NETWORKi,t1 are not available before 2000, whereas
computation of the instrumental variable requires knowledge of the prior year’s board seats for each
director. In addition, we time lag the instrumental variables by one year, which limits the availability of
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we found that boards with lawyer-directors have higher CEO Salary and higher
CEO Excess Compensation. Evaluating the economic effect of lawyer-directors
on CEO Salary, we found that the addition of a lawyer on the board leads to a
5.5% standard deviation increase in CEO Salary.193 The effect on CEO Excess
Compensation is similar, a 5.7% standard deviation increase.194 In addition, a
one standard deviation increase in Predicted JDi,t1 is associated with a 2.4%
standard deviation increase in CEO Salary and an 11% standard deviation
increase in CEO Excess Compensation.195 As a robustness check, we obtained
the same qualitative results as Panel B when we performed a first-difference
data to compute Predicted JDi,t1. The differential in sample sizes also arises from the need to truncate
some dependent variables that have extreme values. Truncation is the process by which a researcher
removes the extreme values of the distribution of a variable to minimize the effect of such “outliers” on
the statistical analysis. For example, truncation at 5% implies that the researcher removes all observa-
tions below 2.5% and above 97.5% of the distribution of the variable. Although this technique allows
for more meaningful statistical analysis, it also lowers and varies the sample sizes. See GREENE, supra
note 149, at 833.
193. This amount is calculated as the coefficient estimate of 0.071 divided by the standard deviation
in CEO Salary of 1.289.
194. This amount is calculated as the coefficient estimate of 0.029 divided by the standard deviation
in CEO Excess Compensation of 0.501.
195. Those amounts are calculated as follows:
For CEO Salary, we multiplied the coefficient estimate (0.146) by the standard deviation in Predicted
JDi,t1 (0.179) and then divided the result by the standard deviation in CEO Salary (1.088).
For CEO Excess Compensation, we multiplied the coefficient estimate (0.31) by the standard
deviation in Predicted JDi,t1 (0.179) and then divided the result by the standard deviation in CEO
Excess Compensation (0.501).
Note that these findings are consistent with our finding higher levels of borrowing when a lawyer is
on the board. See infra notes 298–300 and accompanying text. Higher CEO Salary reduces the potential
for a CEO to be biased in favor of a firm’s shareholders, which could be the case if her compensation
included a significant equity component. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 169, at 255–64. Jensen





Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)









Observations 12,926 9,008 9,511 6,713
Adj. R-Squared 8.7% 10.0% 5.3% 5.4%
This panel presents regressions of CEOSALARYi,t and CEO-EXCESSCOMPi,t on variables that reflect the participation of
a lawyer-director on the board. We included the same control variables as in Panel A but do not show them for brevity.
Regressions included controls for year and industry fixed effects (industry is defined using the Fama-French 49 industry
portfolios). Adjusted R-squared is a measure of model goodness of fit. The ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively.
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regression of CEOSALARYi,t and CEO-EXCESSCOMPi,t against JDi,t1.
196
Panels A and B show two basic shifts in CEO compensation that result when
a lawyer is on the board. First, a lawyer-director results in a change in
incentives, with a higher CEO DELTAi,t and a lower CEO VEGAi,t. CEO
compensation becomes more sensitive to firm value, reducing a CEO’s interest
in risk-taking. That effect is even greater if the lawyer-director has a senior
position on the board as chairman or as part of the compensation committee.
Second, a lawyer-director is likely to cause an increase in CEO salary. Although
incentive compensation is weaker, the CEO’s total compensation is greater.
We believe the results are consistent with three possible explanations. For
one, a lawyer-director may promote more conservative management. In the
ordinary course, the increase in CEO DELTAi,t will reduce her interest in risk-
taking, and the greater salary will encourage her to support strategies that ensure
the firm can continue to pay her.197 There may, however, be a cost to this
incentive structure. If the risk of bankruptcy rises and the value of the CEO’s
shares approaches zero, the CEO may decide to disproportionately increase
risk-taking in a gamble to keep the firm solvent.198 That interest in greater
risk-taking may come at the expense of the firm’s creditors, who would prefer
lower levels of risk in order to preserve sufficient assets in bankruptcy to pay
their claims. The resulting cost is likely to be transferred by the creditors to the
firm and its shareholders through a higher cost of capital.199
The second explanation relates to the “managerial power” view of compensa-
tion.200 It may simply be the case that CEOs are better able to influence
lawyer-directors to cause the board to pay CEOs more, resulting in a rise in total
CEO salary. Here, again, the greater CEO compensation is likely to encourage a
CEO to manage firm performance so that she can continue to be paid. Yet, for
the same reasons as before, that incentive may turn to greater risk-taking—
whose costs to creditors are transferred to the shareholders—in the event the
firm becomes financially troubled.201
Finally, the greater salary may reflect the greater oversight to which a CEO
becomes subject when a lawyer is on the board. In general, average total CEO
compensation declined from 2000 to 2008 (dropping from an average of
& Meckling, supra note 172, at 353; Simone M. Sepe, Making Sense of Executive Compensation, 36
DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 202–03 (2011).
196. The results of this robustness check are on file with the authors.
197. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
198. See Alex Edmans & Qi Liu, Inside Debt, 15 REV. FIN. 75, 87 (2011).
199. See Alces & Galle, supra note 168, at 57–59; Edmans & Liu, supra note 198, at 83.
200. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
201. The first two explanations assume that the CEO’s salary does not include debt (including
pension and other deferred compensation). Consistent with the “inside debt” approach to compensation,
tying a CEO’s pay to debt is expected to make her sensitive to taking on the risk of losses in excess of
the firm’s liquidation value. In that case, the CEO’s incentives to assume greater risk will be tempered
by her interest in ensuring that, if the firm becomes bankrupt, it will still have sufficient assets to pay its
creditors (including her). See Edmans & Liu, supra note 198, at 92.
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$12.3 million in 2000 to $7.3 million in 2008), roughly the same period as our
analysis.202 When a lawyer is on the board, however, higher salaries may
compensate her for the greater oversight that comes with a lawyer-director and
the potential loss of management perquisites.
The result, in all three cases, is a greater cost to the company’s share-
holders—at a minimum, the higher salary paid to the CEO and, potentially, the
costs that result from conflict with the firm’s creditors. The question, which we
address in the next Part, is whether there is an offsetting benefit. To briefly
anticipate that discussion, we find in Part IV that the change in CEO compensa-
tion that occurs when there is a lawyer-director results in an overall decline in
risk-taking and increase in firm value.
B. BOARD STRUCTURE AND TAKEOVER PROTECTIONS
Our next focus is on the effect of a lawyer-director on board structure and
takeover protections. Those relate to the implicit incentives that directors and
officers face over the concern that they can be removed from their jobs for poor
performance.
Board structure can affect the directors’ ability to manage the firm and its
officers. Earlier studies showed an inverse correlation between board size,
BOARDSIZEi,t, and firm value among nonfinancial firms. Those studies found,
on average, that an increase in board size had a negative effect on firm value,203
most likely because, as the number of directors increased, it became more
difficult to coordinate decision making and control over management.204 More
recent studies have found that, as firms become more complex, larger boards
result in higher firm value. Consistent with the board’s managing function,
those studies suggest that the greater size is the result of outside directors who
bring more experience and knowledge to a board’s decision making and provide
more useful advice to the CEO.205
Having a board chairman who is CEO, CEOCHAIRi,t, may also affect board
oversight. The tasks of chairman and CEO are different and potentially conflict-
ing. The CEO is responsible for running the company, and the chairman is
responsible for running the board—one of whose principal functions is monitor-
ing the CEO. A dual CEO-chairman is strategically positioned to pack the board
with directors who are sympathetic to management, as well as to control the
202. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 25, at 1037.
203. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Larger Board Size and Decreasing Firm Value in Small Firms,
48 J. FIN. ECON. 35, 36 (1998); David Yermack, Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small
Board of Directors, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 185, 186–87 (1996).
204. See Jensen, supra note 67, at 862–65 (examining the reasons that the board fails as an effective
control mechanism in the absence of external crises); Yermack, supra note 203, at 186.
205. See Jeffery L. Coles et al., Boards: Does One Size Fit All?, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 329, 330–31
(2008); see also RENÉE B. ADAMS & HAMID MEHRAN, CORPORATE PERFORMANCE, BOARD STRUCTURE, AND
THEIR DETERMINANTS IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY 3–4 (Oct. 2011), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/
research/staff_reports/sr330.pdf.
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board’s agenda.206 Consequently, a board with a dual CEO-chairman may not
be as effective in monitoring senior managers as a board with an independent
chairman.207 Perhaps as a result, the U.S. practice of having a dual CEO-
chairman has apparently begun to decline.208
Takeover protections also affect incentives by insulating the board and
officers from removal, potentially resulting in poorer performance.209 We use
the E Index, EINDEXi,t, and the presence of a classified board (also known as a
“staggered” board), STAGGEREDi,t, as a proxy for board insulation. The E
Index considers six features to be crucial indicators of entrenchment. Of the six,
four are tied to limits on the shareholders’ voting power—whether the firm has a
classified board, limits on the shareholders’ ability to amend the bylaws, and
supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments. The remain-
ing two are well-known takeover defenses—golden parachutes and poison
pills.210
The E Index’s authors found entrenching provisions to correlate with reduced
stock returns.211 For example, in a firm with a classified board, the directors are
divided into classes (usually capped at three) with only one class available for
election each year.212 Since the elections are staggered, no more than one-third
can be elected at a time and no one can replace a majority of directors in a
single year—making the company less attractive to a hostile challenger. As a
result, a classified board may cause a decline in firm value,213 but not in all
cases. An insulated board may be better able to focus on valuable long-term
projects without fear of takeover, even if they fail to boost short-term profits and
206. See Williamson, supra note 157, at 260–62.
207. See Jensen, supra note 67, at 866–67; Thuy-Nga T. Vo, Rating Management Behavior and
Ethics: A Proposal to Upgrade the Corporate Governance Rating Criteria, 34 J. CORP. L. 1, 13 (2008).
208. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 25, at 1029–30.
209. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110,
112–19 (1965); see also Olubunmi Faleye, Classified Boards, Firm Value, and Managerial Entrench-
ment, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 501, 503 (2007) (testing the impact of classified boards on firm value and
concluding that “classified boards are always negatively related to firm value”).
210. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783,
784–85 (2009); see also Jay B. Kesten, Managerial Entrenchment and Shareholder Wealth Revisited:
Theory and Evidence from a Recessionary Financial Market, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1609, 1652–53 (2010)
(defining each of the six indicators of entrenchment).
211. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 210, at 787, 813; see also Gompers et al., supra note 118, at
109–10. Empirical evidence, however, is equivocal on whether hostile takeovers (or the threat of
takeover) provide effective means to discipline senior managers. See MACEY, supra note 65, at 122;
Jill E. Fisch, The Overstated Promise of Corporate Governance, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 923, 942 n.100
(2010).
212. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2012). Boards can also be classified pursuant to a firm’s
bylaws, although this option is less common since shareholders can directly amend the bylaws to
eliminate the classified structure. See John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses:
Blame the Lawyers, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1301, 1392–93 (2001). Some states, such as New York, permit a
board to be divided into four classes. See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 704(a) (McKinney 2012).
213. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409,
410 (2005).
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share prices.214 Board classification can also provide directors with an important
source of leverage in negotiating a higher acquisition price.215 In addition, the
value of a classified board may depend on the nature of the firm. For example,
large, complex firms are likely to benefit from the diverse perspective and
advice that outside directors, with special knowledge or experience, bring to the
board. Those directors are more likely to invest the time and effort needed to
advise a CEO if the threat of removal is lowered.216 Under those circumstances,
the benefits of a classified board can outweigh the costs of entrenchment.217
Similarly, adopting a poison pill can protect directors from replacement,
potentially with the same effect as a classified board.218 Poison pill rights are
issued to shareholders through a dividend. In a typical “flip over” pill, a firm’s
shareholders (other than a prospective acquirer) can exercise the poison pill
rights to purchase new shares from the firm at a substantial discount from their
market price after the acquirer owns or tenders for a threshold amount of shares.
The result, if the poison pill is exercised, is a substantial dilution of the
acquirer’s ownership interest and increase in the cost of the takeover.219 Poison
pills, therefore, reduce the probability of takeovers (particularly if coupled with
a classified board), potentially entrenching directors and managers within the
firm. Like a classified board, however, poison pills may also have benefits.
Board longevity and the greater leverage the board has to negotiate a higher
purchase price can enhance firm value.220
In Table 3, we show the effect of a lawyer-director on board structure and
takeover protections. Overall, the results indicate that lawyer-directors help
shape board structure and the adoption of takeover protections.
The results in Table 3 tend to be more conservative—and potentially more
protective—than when a lawyer is not on the board.
● Boards with at least one lawyer-director are larger in size, more likely to
maintain a dual CEO-chairman position, and have more entrenchment
214. See Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61, 62–63
(1988).
215. See Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 YALE L.J. 621,
629–30 (2003); see also Thomas W. Bates et al., Board Classification and Managerial Entrenchment:
Evidence from the Market for Corporate Control, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 656, 657–58 (2008) (indicating that
target shareholders with classified boards receive a larger proportional share of the total value gains in
mergers relative to the gains of target shareholders of firms with a single class of directors).
216. See Richard H. Koppes et al., Corporate Governance Out of Focus: The Debate over Classified
Boards, 54 BUS. LAW. 1023, 1051 (1999); Seoungpil Ahn & Keshab Shrestha, The Differential Effects
of Classified Boards on Firm Value 3–4 (July 17, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.come/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id1265078.
217. See Ahn & Shrestha, supra note 216, at 3–4; see also Michael D. Frakes, Classified Boards and
Firm Value, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 113, 118 (2007) (using quantile regressions of firm value on classified
board status to determine that classified boards are not wholly negative for firms).
218. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 210, at 793–94.
219. See Jordan M. Barry & John William Hatfield, Pills and Partisans: Understanding Takeover
Defenses, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 632–43 (2012).
220. See TIROLE, supra note 158, at 434.
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provisions (such as a classified board, a poison pill, and similar protec-
tions). The results based on Predicted JDi,t1 are similar.
● Lawyer-directors increase board size by 3.4% in Model (1)221 and
increase the E Index by nearly 10% in Model (3).222 Their presence is
also associated with a nearly 3.3% increase in the probability of having
a CEO-chairman223 and a 5.6% increase in the probability of having a
classified board.224
Our results are consistent with lawyers on the board insulating directors and
managers from oversight, potentially to the shareholders’ detriment. Yet, the
effect, while statistically significant, is relatively small for board size and
having a dual CEO-chairman—suggesting that lawyer-directors may not often
seek changes in board structure. The increase is greater for the E Index and
classified board. What this may indicate is a trade-off between the benefits of a
lawyer-director—such as the positive impact on CEO compensation—and the
costs of insulating the board from the shareholders. Alternatively, the shifts in E
221. This amount is calculated as the coefficient estimate of 0.31 in Model (1) divided by the
average board size of 9.06 (as set out in Appendix B, Panel A).
222. This amount is calculated as the coefficient estimate of 0.281 in Model (3) divided the average
E Index of 2.79 (as set out in Appendix B, Panel A).
223. This amount is calculated as the coefficient estimate of 0.02 in Model (5) divided by the
unconditional probability of having a CEO-Chairman of 0.60 (as set out in Appendix B, Panel A).
224. This amount is calculated as the coefficient estimate of 0.033 in Model (7) divided by the
average probability of having a staggered board of 0.60 (as set out in Appendix B, Panel A).
Table 3. Lawyer-Directors, Board Structure, and Takeover Protections.
Dependent Variables:
BOARDSIZEi,t EINDEXi,t CEOCHAIRi,t STAGGEREDi,t
Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

















Observations 9,267 7,767 9,333 8,172 9,333 8,172 9,582 8,316
Adj. R-Squared 42.9% 42.9% 16.1% 16.1% 9.4% 10.1% 22.6% 23.4%
Table 3 sets forth ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions of various corporate
governance characteristics (BOARDSIZEi,t in Models (1)–(2); EINDEXi,t in Models (3)–(4); CEOCHAIRi,t in Models (5)–(6);
and STAGGEREDi,t in Models (7)–(8)) on JDi,t1 and Predicted JDi,t1. Specifically, we use JDi,t1 in the odd models and
Predicted JDi,t1 (as the predicted value in Model (1) of Table 1) in the even models. We also controlled for (but, for brevity,
do not show) NYSE-Listedi,t1, SIZEi,t1, AVSALESGROWTHi,t1, DIVIDENDSi,t1, CASHi,t1, INSTITUTIONAL OWNi,t1,
OUTSIDE_DIRECTORSi,t1, and year and industry fixed effects (industry is defined using the Fama-French 49 industry
portfolios). Observation count and a measure of fit (adjusted R-squared) are also shown. The ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Index and classified board may reflect a more effective governance structure. A
firm that values outside directors may benefit from greater protections against
takeover. If the likelihood of removal is lowered, lawyer-directors and others
may be more inclined to join the board and invest the effort needed to
understand the business in order to more effectively advise the CEO.225 In
either case, the question is whether changes in board structure and takeover
protections, when there is a lawyer-director, result in a change in firm value. To
anticipate our findings in Part IV, we find that the changes alone negatively
affect firm value, and the addition of a lawyer-director does not produce a
statistically significant result. Our qualitative findings, however, shift direction-
ally from a decrease to an increase in firm value, so that board structure and
takeover protections have a positive effect on firm value when a lawyer is on
the board.226
C. STOCK OPTION BACKDATING
We next consider whether having a lawyer on the board affects the board’s
integrity,227 focusing, in particular, on the accuracy of a company’s public
financial disclosures. Investors must be able to rely on those disclosures in order
to assess the value of their investments, as well as oversee how well the board
and managers are performing.228 Undetected, improper disclosure may insulate
the board and managers from shareholder oversight. Consequently, financial
misconduct, when discovered, causes a substantial loss of a firm’s reputation
that, in turn, results in a significant drop in earnings due to lower sales and
higher contracting and financing costs.229
A recent series of financial disclosure scandals arose from stock option
backdating. Backdating involved a company’s grant of stock options, often to
senior officers, as of a date preceding and at a strike price below the stock’s
value on the actual date of grant.230 In most cases, backdating had adverse tax
225. See supra notes 214–17, 220, 225–26, and accompanying text.
226. See infra Table 6, Panel B, and accompanying text.
227. In this Article, “integrity” refers to the board conducting itself in an honest manner. See A.B.A.
BUS. LAW SEC., CORPORATE LAWS COMM., CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK 6 (Hillary A. Sale &
Holly J. Gregory eds., 6th ed. 2011).
228. See Ronald C. Anderson et al., Board Characteristics, Accounting Report Integrity, and the
Cost of Debt, 37 J. ACCT. & ECON. 315, 316 (2004).
229. See Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 582, 598–99 (2008) (demonstrating that, on average, firms lose 38% of
their market value when news of their financial misconduct is reported, largely due to adjustments to
reflect the actual market value, expectations of legal penalties, and lost reputation).
230. For example, assume Company A’s compensation committee agrees to grant an option to the
CEO on 10,000 shares of Company A stock on March 15, when the shares trade on the NYSE at
$50/share. In the ordinary course, the option’s strike price would also be $50/share; the option would
have been issued “at the money.” In this case, Company A’s shares traded at $40/share one month
earlier, on February 15, and—in an effort to benefit the CEO—the relevant documentation stated that
the CEO options were granted on February 15 with a strike price at the then-current market price of
$40/share. At the time the options were actually issued (market price of $50/share), the option was
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and accounting consequences—none of which were disclosed to the Internal Revenue
Service, the firm’s auditors, or its shareholders—and in some cases, resulted in the
company being required to restate its publicly reported earnings. Backdating also
often ran afoul of the terms of the benefit plans under which the options were
granted.231 When discovered, the implicated firms lost an average market value of
$389 million during the 21-day period around the first announcement of the prob-
lem.232 We use the litigation around stock option backdating as one measure of a
board’s integrity in relation to the company’s public financial disclosures.
In Table 4 below, we estimated dummy variable models (Probit models)
where the dependent variable was 1 if the corporation had option backdating
litigation in the current fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. The results demonstrate that
the presence of a lawyer-director significantly lowered the likelihood of stock-
option-backdating litigation.
already in-the-money by $10/share (reflecting the strike price of $40/share). Company A could have
granted the CEO an in-the-money option on March 15, but it would have suffered negative tax and
accounting consequences (as well as potentially violating Company A’s own rules on options pricing).
See David I. Walker, Unpacking Backdating: Economic Analysis and Observations on the Stock Option
Scandal, 87 B.U. L. REV. 561, 570 (2007).
231. See M. P. Narayanan et al., The Economic Impact of Backdating of Executive Stock Options,
105 MICH. L. REV. 1597, 1600–01 (2007); Walker, supra note 230, at 570–71.
232. See Narayanan et al., supra note 231, at 1601.













Pseudo R-squared 18.9% 18.2%
Table 4 presents a regression analysis with the dependent variable being the probability of stock option backdating
litigation (OPTION_BACKDATING_LITi,t) and the main explanatory variables being JDi,t1 or Predicted JDi,t1. Models (1)
and (2) are Probit models showing the actual, rather than marginal, effects of the independent variables on the probability of
stock option backdating litigation. We determined Predicted JDi,t1 as the predicted value from Model (1) in Table 1. We also
controlled for (but, for brevity, do not show) NYSE-Listedi,t1, SIZEi,t1, AVSALESGROWTHi,t1, DIVIDENDSi,t1,
CASHi,t1, OUTSIDE_DIRECTORSi,t1, and year and industry fixed effects (industry is defined using the Fama-French 49
industry portfolios). Observation count and a measure of fit (pseudo R-squared) are also shown. The ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Within our universe of companies, the probability of stock-option-backdating
litigation was quite small, only 32 basis points.233 Note, however, that with a
lawyer-director, the marginal effect was a 23 basis points reduction in probabil-
ity.234 In other words, in relative terms, the presence of a lawyer-director
diminished the likelihood of stock option backdating litigation by nearly 78%.235
A one standard deviation increase in Predicted JDi,t1 using Model (2) was
associated with a 22.9% decline in the probability of backdating litigation.236
Evidence on the relationship between board independence and fraudulent
disclosure is mixed. In theory, independent directors ensure the honesty of a
firm’s financial reporting—a principal reason why listed firms are required to
have an audit committee composed of independent directors.237 In addition,
there is evidence that independent directors help control fraud,238 but that evidence
is also consistent with the possibility that fraud-doers simply avoid independent
director oversight.239 The evidence is also mixed on financial reporting.240
Although not dispositive, our analysis suggests that a focus on only indepen-
dence may be misplaced. A lawyer-director minimizes the probability of stock
option backdating, consistent with the possibility that the training and experi-
ence of members of the board may also be an important part of the analysis.
IV. THE (POST-)MODERN CORPORATION—RISK TAKING, FIRM VALUE,
AND THE MANAGING BOARD
It may be useful to quickly take stock of where we are. Lawyer-directors are
special; their value extends beyond traditional monitoring and agency cost
reduction. They bring to the board the ability to spot issues, and they provide a
233. This estimate is based on unconditional probability as reported in Appendix B.
234. This is because the marginal effect in the Probit Model (1) in Table 4 is 0.0023, correspond-
ing to the coefficient estimate of 0.79.
235. This amount is calculated as the ratio of the marginal effect of 0.0023 to the average
unconditional probability of option backdating of 0.0032 as reported in Appendix B.
236. This amount is the marginal effect coefficient of 0.0041 (which corresponds to the estimated
coefficient of 0.93), multiplied by the standard deviation in Predicted JDi,t1 of 0.179 as reported in
Appendix B, divided by the average unconditional probability of option backdating of 0.0032 as
reported in Appendix B.
237. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Mark S. Beasley, An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board of
Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud, 71 ACCT. REV. 443, 454–56 (1996); Patricia M.
Dechow et al., Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to
Enforcement Actions by the SEC, 13 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 1, 4–5, 21–22, 30 (1996); Hatice Uzun et al.,
Board Composition and Corporate Fraud, 60 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 33, 33, 41–42 (2004). Not all studies
have found a correlation between independence and a reduction in illegal activities. For example, one
study found that firms with a majority of outside directors were not involved in fewer illegal acts than
firms with a majority of inside directors. See Idalene F. Kesner et al., Board Composition and the
Commission of Illegal Acts: An Investigation of Fortune 500 Companies, 29 ACAD. MGMT. J. 789, 795
(1986).
239. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 16, at 233 (describing the lack of evidence that increasing the
number of independent directors on the board is an adequate response to business troubles).
240. See id.
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perspective on decisions based on training, experience, and judgment that
nonlawyers may not have.241 Although CEO compensation can increase with a
lawyer-director,242 it is also more likely to be made up of stock and other
instruments that provide the CEO with risk-reducing incentives.243 In addition,
lawyer-directors bring important management benefits to the firm, including an
expertise in litigation and regulation. Businesses with intangible assets, such as
patents, are more likely to include lawyer-directors who can assist in protecting
those assets,244 and firms involved in other types of litigation are also more
likely to have a lawyer on the board.245 Lawyer-directors also influence a firm’s
board structure and takeover protections. Although the changes may weaken
shareholder oversight over directors and officers, they can also encourage a
wider range of outside directors to join the board, providing valuable advice to
the CEO.246 Finally, using stock option backdating as a proxy, board integrity
(in relation to public financial disclosures) also benefits from having a lawyer
on the board.247
In this Part, we consider the effect of having a lawyer-director on firm
risk-taking and firm value. Our particular concern is whether the level of risk
that results from having a lawyer-director increases or decreases firm value. We
also focus on the channels through which a lawyer-director can influence both
outcomes.
A. RISK-TAKING
At the outset, one might ask whether diversified shareholders should value
the change in risk-taking that results from having a lawyer on the board. Within
the contractarian model, investors can inexpensively manage risk on their own
by diversifying their holdings across a portfolio of firms.248 On that basis, it
may not be efficient for a lawyer-director to manage risk on the investors’
behalf, unless she can do so in ways that shareholders cannot duplicate for
themselves. Directors and managers, for example, are able to access confidential
information, giving them an edge over shareholders in assessing and managing
a firm’s risk.249 As with risk management generally, they can use that informa-
241. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
242. See supra Table 2, Panel B, and accompanying text.
243. See supra Table 2, Panel A, and accompanying text.
244. See supra Table 1 and accompanying text.
245. See supra Table 1 and accompanying text; see also Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the
Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 902–03 (1990) (explaining the
value to a corporation of having in-house legal knowledge, rather than relying on outside counsel).
Greater complexity also raises the probability of having a lawyer on the board. See supra Table 1 and
accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 214–17, 220, 225–26 and accompanying text.
247. See supra Table 4 and accompanying text.
248. See Fama & Jensen, supra note 52, at 302–03.
249. See Lisa K. Meulbroek, A Senior Manager’s Guide to Integrated Risk Management, 14
J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 56, 58 (2002).
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tion to reduce the firm’s cash flow instability, freeing up capital that would
otherwise be set aside against the risk of future losses.250 Increased cash flow
predictability may also permit firms to make additional value-enhancing invest-
ments using internal funds that are less costly than equity or debt,251 increasing
firm value over time252 and, as the investments generate new revenues, further
reducing the firm’s cost of financing.253 In addition, the firm may lower the real
costs of financial distress—such as bankruptcy costs, indirect costs from a
decline in market competitiveness, and risk premiums demanded by customers,
suppliers, and employees.254 The firm can also increase its debt capacity255
without requiring the increase in the cost of debt predicted by the Miller-
Modigliani irrelevancy propositions.256 Finally, shareholders may be better able
to manage their own portfolio risk, reducing their expected returns on equity
and, in turn, the firm’s cost of capital.257 None of those real benefits can be
duplicated at the shareholder level. A value-maximizing firm, therefore, has an
incentive to manage its risk-taking to the extent that doing so creates greater
value for its shareholders.
In Table 5, Panel A, below, we relate two dependent variables, ZSCOREi,t
and IMPLVOLi,t, to proxies for having a lawyer-director on the board. ZSCOREi,t
and IMPLVOLi,t are distinct measures of risk; Z-Score is a measure of the risk
of insolvency,258 and implied volatility is a more general measure of risk.259
250. See Brian W. Nocco & René M. Stulz, Enterprise Risk Management: Theory and Practice, 18
J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 11–14 (2006).
251. See Kenneth A. Froot et al., Risk Management: Coordinating Corporate Investment and
Financing Policies, 48 J. FIN. 1629, 1630–31 (1993); Bernadette A. Minton & Catherine Schrand, The
Impact of Cash Flow Volatility on Discretionary Investment and the Costs of Debt and Equity
Financing, 54 J. FIN. ECON. 423, 438–40 (1999).
252. See George Allayannis et al., Earnings Volatility, Cash Flow Volatility, and Firm Value 3,
26–27 (Dec. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/seminarscalendar/
Rountree.doc (finding that cash flow volatility is negatively associated with firm value, whereas
earnings volatility is more likely to be positively valued).
253. See Minton & Schrand, supra note 251, at 449–55, 456 tbl.8 (demonstrating that volatility is
directly related to the costs of accessing external capital).
254. See Lisa K. Meulbroek, The Efficiency of Equity-Linked Compensation: Understanding the Full
Cost of Awarding Executive Stock Options, 30 FIN. MGMT. 5, 35 (2001); Clifford W. Smith & René M.
Stulz, The Determinants of Firms’ Hedging Policies, 20 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 391, 395–98
(1985).
255. See Walter Dolde, Hedging, Leverage, and Primitive Risk, 4 J. FIN. ENGINEERING 187, 200–13
(1995).
256. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the
Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 261–71 (1958).
257. See Christopher Géczy et al., Why Firms Use Currency Derivatives, 52 J. FIN. 1323, 1328
(1997) (theorizing how firms can reduce financial distress associated with long-term debt).
258. The Z-Score was introduced by Edward I. Altman in Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis
and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy, 23 J. FIN. 589 (1968). This measure is a linear combina-
tion of five common business ratios related to the risk of insolvency. Altman developed the Z-Score
using a sample of 66 firms, of which 33 had filed for bankruptcy and 33 had not. Based on a review of
those firms, he concluded that companies with a Z-Score above 2.99 were safe from bankruptcy, and
those below 1.81 were almost certain to go bankrupt. See id. at 606. In a series of subsequent tests
covering three periods over 30 years (until 1999), the model was accurate in 80–90% of the cases in
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Note that a higher Z-Score is interpreted as a lower risk of bankruptcy, whereas
higher implied volatility is interpreted as a higher level of corporate risk.
Z-Score is also a historical measure of risk (because it is calculated on the basis
of historical accounting data), whereas implied volatility is a forward-looking
measure of risk (because it is derived from traded option prices).260 The proxies
for having a lawyer-director are JDi,t1, Predicted JDi,t1, JD_OUTSIDEi,t1
(when a lawyer-director is not an employee), JD_CHAIRMANi,t1 (when a
lawyer-director is also chairman of the board), JD_RISKCOMi,t1 (when a
lawyer-director is a member of the board’s risk management committee), and
JD_CHAIR_RISKCOMi,t1 (when a lawyer-director is chairman of the board’s
risk management committee). As Panel A indicates, in general, having a lawyer
on the board results in lower risk-taking, and the risk-reducing effect is even
more significant when the lawyer-director has a more prominent role on the
board. In addition, we find that lawyer-directors who are insiders (for example,
lawyer-CEOs who are also directors) are more likely to reduce corporate risk
than outside lawyer-directors.
Table 5’s regression analysis included the same control variables as in Table
2: NYSE-Listedi,t1, SIZEi,t1, AVSALESGROWTHi,t1, DIVIDENDSi,t1,
CASHi,t1, OUTSIDE_DIRECTORSi,t1, and year and industry indicator
variables. We expected those variables to influence a firm’s risk choices. Listing
on the NYSE, NYSE-Listedi,t1, relates to risk because listed firms are subject
to higher levels of corporate governance regulation (and related litigation).261
Firms with large total assets, SIZEi,t1, tend to be more conservative in their
investment choices because their investments are greater—and potentially
less risky—than the investments of average firms (assuming that a project’s
riskiness is inverse to its size).262 Firms with high average sales growth,
AVSALESGROWTHi,t1, are more likely to make new (and potentially risky)
predicting bankruptcy one year before the event (with a false negative of approximately 15–20%). See
Edward I. Altman, Predicting Financial Distress of Companies: Revisiting the Z-Score and ZETA
Models 17–18, 21–22 (NYU Working Paper, 2000), available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/ealtman/
PredFnclDistr.pdf.
259. The implied volatility of a stock option contract is a value, related to the shares underlying
the option, that will return a theoretical price equal to the then-current market price of the option. As
first suggested by Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities,
81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973), implied volatility is a forward-looking measure of risk. See also
Charles Cao et al., The Information Content of Option-Implied Volatility for Credit Default Swap
Valuation, 13 J. FIN. MARKETS 321, 331 (2010). For purposes of this Article, we calculated a company’s
implied volatility by finding the implied volatility of exchange-traded, standardized European-style call
options with a ninety-day maturity on that company’s shares, and then averaging the implied volatility
for each calendar year.
260. The correlation between the two dependent variables is 0.189. Although they measure
different aspects of corporate risk, higher levels of bankruptcy risk (a lower Z-Score) are associated
with higher levels of corporate risk (higher implied volatility). The correlation coefficient is negative
because Z-Score is a measure of safety and implied volatility is a measure of risk.
261. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
262. See Kose John et al., Corporate Governance and Risk-Taking, 63 J. FIN. 1679, 1681 (2008).
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investments in order to continue growing.263 However, firms that have an
established history of paying dividends, DIVIDENDSi,t1, may be more likely
to pursue conservative projects in order to maintain the cash flow necessary to
continue doing so.264 In addition, firms that generate significant cash reserves,
CASHi,t1, may be established in their industry and, therefore, less willing to
pursue risky ventures. Self-interested managers, however, may decide to invest
those reserves in risky projects that are value-destroying, in which case, firms
with greater CASHi,t1 may also take on greater risk.
265 In controlling for the
proportion of outside directors on the board, OUTSIDE_DIRECTORSi,t1, our
goal was to determine whether the effect of lawyer-directors is analogous to the
effect of any other outside director or whether lawyer-directors have special
features.
In addition, we controlled for CEO DELTAi,t1 and CEO VEGAi,t1.
266
Those variables were used to check whether there is still a role for lawyer-
directors to reduce risk after controlling for CEO incentives. Empirically, a
higher CEO DELTAi,t1 has corresponded to lower corporate risk,
267 and CEOs
with higher CEO VEGAi,t1 are more likely to implement riskier policies (such
as greater investment in research and development).268
Our findings show that a lawyer-director, under all proxies for having a
lawyer on the board, reduces risk as measured by ZSCOREi,t and IMPLVOLi,t.
Turning to the economic significance of the results, we also found the follow-
ing:
● Based on the coefficients in Panel A, adding a lawyer-director results in
a 6.6% increase in Z-Score269 and a 1% decrease in implied volatility.270
Because implied volatility is a generic measure of risk and Z-Score
measures bankruptcy risk, we can conclude that a lawyer-director’s
presence has a greater impact on reducing the risk of corporate default.
● Our results on the economic impact on risk remain significant if we use
Predicted JDi,t1. A one standard deviation increase in Predicted JDi,t1
is associated with a 3.3% increase in Z-Score, indicating a reduction in
263. See id. (finding that higher firm-level riskiness is positively associated with firm-level growth).
264. See Alon Brav et al., Payout Policy in the 21st Century, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 483, 490 (2005) (based
on manager interviews, finding that firms are more likely to pass up new net present value investment
projects before cutting dividends).
265. See id.
266. We also considered INSTITUTIONAL OWNi,t1 but did not include it as a formal control
because it was statistically insignificant.
267. See Coles et al., supra note 179, at 432 (discussing how increased delta exposes managers to
more risk). For a description of delta, see supra note 179 and accompanying text.
268. See Coles et al., supra note 179, at 432–33. For a description of vega, see supra note 180–81
and accompanying text.
269. This amount is equal to the coefficient estimate of 0.11 divided by the average Z-Score of 1.659
(as set out in Appendix B, Panel A).
270. This amount is equal to the coefficient estimate of 0.004 divided by average implied volatility
of 0.401 (as set out in Appendix B, Panel A).
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bankruptcy risk.271 Likewise, a one standard deviation increase in Pre-
dicted JDi,t1 is associated with a 2.4% decrease in implied volatility.
272
● The foregoing results are higher still if the lawyer-director is also the
board’s chairman. In that instance, Z-Score rises significantly, by
34.4%,273 while implied volatility drops by 4.74%.274
● Note that the economic effect of nonexecutive lawyer-directors (JD_
OUTSIDEi,t1) on risk reduction is less significant than the impact of
JDi,t1. Thus, executive lawyer-directors (such as lawyer-CEOs who are
also directors) are likely to reduce corporate risk more significantly than
outside lawyer-directors.275
● Our results on lawyer-directors and corporate risk-taking are robust after
performing first-difference regressions that control for all firm character-
istics.276
Next, in Panels B, C, and D, we considered the channels through which a
lawyer-director could lower risk. Our hypothesis was that lawyer-directors
affect risk through CEO compensation and efficient litigation management.
Recall that lawyer-directors change a firm’s CEO incentive structures (CEO
DELTAi,t1 and CEO VEGAi,t1),
277 and so, in Panel B, we analyzed the impact
of that change on a firm’s risk-taking. In Panels C and D, because the probabil-
ity of future litigation is a determinant of having a lawyer-director,278 we also
analyzed the combined impact of lawyer-directors and litigation on a firm’s
risk-taking. The results in each of those panels supported our views.
To test the first channel, CEO compensation, we studied the impact on
risk-taking of the interaction between having a lawyer-director and CEO in-
centives—CEO DELTAi,t1 and CEO VEGAi,t1. We expected higher CEO
DELTAi,t1 to lower corporate risk-taking and for its interaction with JDi,t1 to
further reduce the level of risk incurred by the firm. We also expected higher
levels of CEO VEGAi,t1 to increase corporate risk-taking but for that effect to
271. This amount is calculated as the coefficient estimate of 0.31, multiplied by one standard
deviation in Predicted JDi,t1 of 0.179, divided by an average Z-Score of 1.659 (as set out in
Appendix B, Panel A).
272. This amount is calculated as the coefficient estimate of 0.053, multiplied by one standard
deviation in Predicted JDi,t1 of 0.179, divided by average implied volatility of 0.401 (as set out in
Appendix B, Panel A).
273. This amount is equal to the coefficient estimate of 0.57 divided by the average Z-Score of 1.659
(as set out in Appendix B, Panel A).
274. This amount is equal to the coefficient estimate of 0.019 divided by the average implied
volatility of 0.401 (as set out in Appendix B, Panel A).
275. When we restrict JDi,t1 to exclude JD_OUTSIDEi,t1, the coefficient estimate of lawyer-
directors that are not JD_OUTSIDEi,t1 is still significant at the 1% level and increases from 0.11 to
0.12. Likewise, the presence of an executive lawyer-director is associated with an increase in firm
value. See infra note 317 and accompanying text.
276. The results are set out in Appendix C, which confirm the negative impact of JDi,t on corporate
risk-taking.
277. See supra Table 2, Panel A, and accompanying text.
278. See supra Table 1 and accompanying text.
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be reversed if a lawyer is on the board.
● As anticipated, CEO DELTAi,t1 increases Z-Score and decreases im-
plied volatility. Its interaction with JDi,t1 further increases Z-Score and
further decreases implied volatility. More importantly, the presence of a
lawyer-director increases the risk-reducing effect of CEO DELTAi,t1 on
Z-Score by 64%279 and on implied volatility by 121%.280
● Next, as anticipated, the effect of CEO VEGAi,t1 is to increase risk. Its
interaction with JDi,t1 reduces risk, as measured by Z-Score, by nearly
92% and reduces risk, when measured as implied volatility, by nearly
30%.281
● We see the same qualitative results when we examine the alternative
roles played by lawyer-directors, such as chairman of the board or
chairman of the risk management committee.
We also investigated the effect on corporate risk of a lawyer-director’s
influence on board structure and takeover protections using the same controls as
in Table 5, Panel, B.282 BOARDSIZEi,t1, EINDEXi,t1, and STAGGEREDi,t1
have a negative impact on corporate risk-taking.283 We obtained the same
qualitative results when we considered the effect of a lawyer-director on those
variables.284 Conversely, having a CEO who is also chairman of the board,
CEOCHAIRi,t1, increases corporate risk-taking, but the result is reversed when
there is a lawyer on the board.285
In Panels C and D, we studied the influence of lawyer-directors on risk
through their management of litigation. We split litigation into two panels. In
the first, we included patent litigation, PATENT_LITi,t1 (patent litigation). In
the second, we included SECURITIES_LAWi,t1 (securities law litigation),
279. This amount is calculated as the ratio of the coefficient of JDi,t1  CEO DELTAi,t1 of 0.0001
to the coefficient of CEO DELTAi,t1 of 0.000156.
280. This amount is calculated as the ratio of the coefficient of JDi,t1  CEO DELTAi,t1 of 0.0001
to the coefficient of CEO DELTAi,t1 of 0.0000826.
281. The economic effect on Z-Score is estimated as the ratio of the coefficient estimate for JDi,t1 *
CEO VEGAi,t1 of 0.001 to the CEO VEGAi,t1 coefficient estimate of 0.00108. The economic effect
on implied volatility is estimated as the ratio of the coefficient estimate for JDi,t1 * CEO VEGAi,t1 of
0.0001 to the CEO VEGAi,t1 coefficient estimate of 0.00033.
282. Those results have not been tabulated because most of the coefficient estimates are not
statistically significant.
283. These results appear online at http://georgetownlawjournal.org/articles/lawyers-and-fools/.
284. These results appear online at http://georgetownlawjournal.org/articles/lawyers-and-fools/.
285. Specifically, CEOCHAIRi,t1 has a negative effect on ZSCOREi,t. That effect is statistically
significant at the 10% level and corresponds to a 4.5% decrease in ZSCOREi,t. Similarly, CEOCHAIRi,t
has a positive effect on IMPLVOLi,t. The effect is statistically significant at the 10% level and
corresponds to a 1.7% increase in IMPLVOLi,t. When CEOCHAIRi,t1 is interacted with a lawyer-
director, the effect on ZSCOREi,t is not statistically significant, but its economic significance corre-
sponds to a 2.71% increase in ZSCOREi,t. Similarly, when CEOCHAIRi,t1 is interacted with a
lawyer-director, the effect on IMPLVOLi,t is not statistically significant, but its economic effect
corresponds to a 2.2% decrease in IMPLVOLi,t.
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CLASSACTIONi,t1 (class action litigation), and ACCOUNTING_LITi,t1 (ac-
counting malpractice litigation). Patent litigation can reduce risk by defining the
ownership boundaries of a firm’s assets, particularly intangible assets like
patents. We expected that having a lawyer on the board would have a risk-
reducing effect, which would be stronger for firms with more intangible assets.
The second three categories were expected to increase firm risk by potentially
reducing firm profitability. Accordingly, we expected lawyer-directors to help
manage litigation efficiently, and by doing so, to reduce the impact of such
litigation on firm risk.
Our findings in Panel C support our hypothesis. First, as shown in Models
(1) and (3), patent litigation increases Z-Score (in other words, decreases risk),
as does its interaction with JDi,t1. Second, in Models (2) and (4), patent
litigation decreases implied volatility (in other words, decreases risk), as does
its interaction with JDi,t1. Third, we note the relative economic effect of JDi,t1
on risk through its interaction with patent litigation. Using Model (1), for
example, the presence of a lawyer-director increases the risk-reducing effect of
patent litigation by an additional 60%. The relative economic effect is even
stronger when measured through implied volatility in Model (2). There, the
Table 5—Panel B. Risk-Taking and Lawyer-Directors.
Interactions with CEO
DELTAi,t1 Interactions with CEO VEGAi,t1
Z-SCOREi.t IMPL-VOLi,t Z-SCOREi,t IMPL-VOLi,t

















































This panel presents summary coefficient estimates of regressions similar to those in Table 5, Panel A, with the dependent
variables being ZSCOREi,t and IMPLVOLi,t, and interactions of CEO DELTAi,t and CEO VEGAi,t with the main explanatory
variables JDi,t1, JD_OUTSIDEi,t1, JD_CHAIRMANi,t1, JD_RISKCOMi,t1, and JD_CHAIR_RISKCOMi,t1. For brevity,
we only report the interactions. We also controlled for (but, for brevity, do not show) CEO DELTAi,t1, CEO VEGAi,t1,
NYSE-Listedi,t1, SIZEi,t1, AVSALESGROWTHi,t1, DIVIDENDSi,t1, CASHi,t1, OUTSIDE_DIRECTORSi,t1, year and
industry fixed effects (industry is defined using the Fama-French 49 industry portfolios). The ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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risk-reducing effect of patent litigation is amplified by 700%286 if there is a
lawyer-director. In Model (3), the relative economic effect of patent litigation
on risk-taking if there is a lawyer-director is 421% greater for firms having a
high level of intangible assets compared to firms with a low level of intangible
assets.287 Similar calculations of the relative economic effect on implied volatil-
ity in Model (4) yield a relative risk reduction of nearly 117%.288
In Panel D, we studied the effect of a lawyer-director on risk when consider-
ing nonpatent litigation. Our findings also support our hypothesis.
Accounting malpractice, securities law, and class action litigation increase a
firm’s level of risk as measured by Z-Score or implied volatility. This increase is
economically meaningful. For example, if there is accounting malpractice
286. This amount is the ratio of the coefficients, 0.0141 and 0.002.
287. This amount is the ratio of the coefficient of the triple interaction, 0.5225, to the coefficient of
patent litigation, 0.124.
288. This amount is the ratio of the coefficient of the triple interaction, 0.007, to the coefficient of
patent litigation, 0.006.
Table 5—Panel C. Risk-Taking and Lawyer-Directors.
Dependent Variables:
Z-SCOREi,t IMPL-VOLi,t Z-SCOREi,t IMPL-VOLi,t













































Observations 11,743 8,132 11,743 8,132
Adj. R-squared 26.3% 51.1% 26.7% 51.5%
This panel presents summary coefficient estimates from regressions similar to those in Table 5, Panel A, with the
dependent variables being ZSCOREi,t and IMPLVOLi,t and the main explanatory variables being JDi,t1, PATENT_LITi,t1,
and the interaction between these two variables in Models (1) and (2); and JDi,t1, INTANGIBLE ASSETSi,t1,
PATENT_LITi,t1, and the interactions among these three variables in Models (3) and (4). We also controlled for (but, for
brevity, do not show) CEO DELTAi,t1, CEO VEGAi,t1, NYSE-Listedi,t1, SIZEi,t1, AVSALESGROWTHi,t1, DIVIDEND-
Si,t1, CASHi,t1, OUTSIDE_DIRECTORSi,t1, year and industry fixed effects (industry is defined using the Fama-French 49
industry portfolios). Observation count and a measure of fit (adjusted R-squared) are also shown. The ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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litigation, bankruptcy risk is raised by nearly 35%;289 for securities law litiga-
tion, bankruptcy risk is raised by 28.4%;290 and for class action litigation,
bankruptcy risk is raised by 17.9%.291 Calculating the corresponding impact on
implied volatility, we obtained 21.9% for accounting malpractice litigation,292
289. This amount is the ratio of the coefficient of ACCOUNTING_LITi,t1 of 0.5813 divided by
the average Z-Score of 1.659 (as set out in Appendix B, Panel A).
290. This amount is the ratio of the coefficient of SECURITIES_LITi,t1 of 0.4717 divided by the
average Z-Score of 1.659 (as set out in Appendix B, Panel A).
291. This amount is the ratio of the coefficient of CLASSACTION_LITi,t1 of 0.2972 divided by
the average Z-Score of 1.659 (as set out in Appendix B, Panel A).
292. This amount is the ratio of the coefficient of ACCOUNTING_LITi,t1 of 0.0877 divided by
average implied volatility of 0.401 (as set out in Appendix B, Panel A).













































This panel presents summary coefficient estimates of regressions similar to those in Table 5, Panel A, with the dependent
variables being ZSCOREi,t and IMPLVOLi,t and the main explanatory variables being JDi,t1 and SECURITIES_LITi,t1,
CLASSACTION_LITi,t1, and ACCOUNTING_LITi,t1. Each litigation category is also interacted with JDi,t1. We also
controlled for (but, for brevity, do not show) CEO DELTAi,t1, CEO VEGAi,t1, NYSE-Listedi,t1, SIZEi,t1,
AVSALESGROWTHi,t1, DIVIDENDSi,t1, CASHi,t1, OUTSIDE_DIRECTORSi,t1, and year and industry fixed effects
(industry is defined using the Fama-French 49 industry portfolios). For brevity, observation count and a measure of fit
(adjusted R-squared) are not shown. The ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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12.8% for securities law litigation,293 and 11.3% for class action litigation.294
The effect of litigation on risk drops in the presence of a lawyer-director. For
example, lawyer-directors decrease the effect of accounting malpractice litiga-
tion on bankruptcy risk from a 35% increase to a 13.5% increase.295 Similarly,
having a lawyer-director reduces the effect of securities law litigation on
bankruptcy risk from a 28.4% increase to a mere 5.8% increase.296 Finally, for
class action litigation, the presence of a lawyer-director reduces bankruptcy risk
from a 17.9% increase to a 5.6% increase.297 Similar calculations confirm
similar results for implied volatility.
The greater stability (as implied by higher Z-Score and lower implied volatil-
ity) means that firms can efficiently increase their borrowing capacity.298 Based
on the empirical analysis we performed for risk (Table 5, Panel A), we found
that the presence of a lawyer-director corresponds with a 10.5%299 increase in
leverage,300 which is statistically significant at the 1% level. That increase is
consistent with our earlier discussion of the real benefits of lowering the costs of
293. This amount is the ratio of the coefficient of SECURITIES_LITi,t1 of 0.0514 divided by
average implied volatility of 0.401 (as set out in Appendix B, Panel A).
294. This amount is the ratio of the coefficient of CLASSACTION_LITi,t1 of 0.0453 divided by
average implied volatility of 0.401 (as set out in Appendix B, Panel A).
295. The reduction of the effect of ACCOUNTING_LITi,t1 on Z-Score from 35% to 13.5%, a drop
of 21.5%, is calculated as the coefficient estimate for ACCOUNTING_LITi,t1  JDi,t1 of 0.357 plus
the coefficient estimate of ACCOUNTING_LITi,t1 of 0.5813, the sum of which is then divided by
the average Z-Score of 1.659 (as set out in Appendix B, Panel A). Note that this finding is consistent
with the view that independent directors look to ensure that a company’s financial disclosure is
accurate. See Fisch, supra note 211, at 932. One study found that independence alone does not result in
a decline in the probability of a company’s earnings restatement. Rather, the probability of restatement
significantly declines if a board or audit committee has an independent director with financial expertise.
See Anup Agrawal & Sahiba Chadha, Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals, 48 J.L. &
ECON. 371, 374 (2005).
296. The reduction of the effect of SECURITIES_LITi,t1 on Z-Score from 28.4% to 5.8%, a drop of
22.6%, is calculated as the coefficient estimate for SECURITIES_LITi,t1  JDi,t1 of 0.376 plus the
coefficient estimate of SECURITIES_LITi,t1 of 0.4717, the sum of which is then divided by the
average Z-Score of 1.659 (as set out in Appendix B, Panel A).
297. The reduction of the effect of CLASSACTION_LITi,t1 on Z-Score from 17.9% to 5.6%, a
drop of 12.3%, is calculated as the coefficient estimate for CLASSACTION_LITi,t1  JDi,t1 of 0.204
plus the coefficient estimate of CLASSACTION_LITi,t1 of 0.2972, the sum of which is then divided
by the average Z-Score of 1.659 (as set out in Appendix B, Panel A). Note that this finding is consistent
with the finding that more independent boards are less likely to be subject to shareholder lawsuits. See
Eric Helland & Michael Sykuta, Who’s Monitoring the Monitor? Do Outside Directors Protect
Shareholders’ Interests?, 40 FIN. REV. 155, 157 (2005).
298. See Michael Faulkender & Mitchell A. Petersen, Does the Source of Capital Affect Capital
Structure?, 19 REV. FIN. STUD. 45, 48 (2006).
299. We compute this magnitude as the coefficient estimate of 0.021 divided by average leverage of
0.20.
300. We compute leverage as the ratio of book debt to total assets. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth
R. French, Testing Trade-Off and Pecking Order Predictions About Dividends and Debt, 15 REV. FIN.
STUD. 1, 8–9 (2002). Book debt is defined as total assets minus total liabilities and preferred stock plus
deferred taxes and convertible debt. We drop firm-year observations where the resulting book leverage
is greater than one. All data used to compute leverage were retrieved from the Compustat database.
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financial distress.301 In addition to reducing financing costs, the higher levels of
borrowing may also provide a monitoring benefit.302 Most corporate debt is
private,303 and most private lenders are banks.304 Banks can monitor corporate
performance at low cost, relying on loan covenants—early warning “trip wires”305
that assist in managing credit risk306—to oversee the board and senior manag-
ers.307 Debt governance is also evolving with changes in the private credit
markets. With greater liquidity, lenders can increasingly rely on the price of
outstanding credit instruments to assess a firm’s credit quality. Thus, if a
borrower acts in a way that changes the price of its loans or other credit
instruments, those changes will influence the terms on which lenders subse-
quently agree to extend credit. Actions that increase credit risk, consequently,
will increase a borrower’s cost of capital. Although covenants continue to play
an important role, some portion of the traditional reliance may be offset by the
“real time” discipline provided by fluctuations in the cost of capital.308 The
greater reliance on debt governance may help to offset the negative effect of
board structure and takeover protections which accompany a lawyer-director,309
providing an efficient substitute for the potential decline in public market
301. See supra notes 248–57 and accompanying text.
302. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The Prime Directive, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 921,
937–39 (2007); Kose John & Lubomir Litov, Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure: New
Evidence, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 693, 695 (2010); Joanna M. Shepherd et al., What Else Matters
for Corporate Governance?: The Case of Bank Monitoring, 88 B.U. L. REV. 991, 995–96 (2008)
(positing that both contractual requirements and institutional features facilitate monitoring); see also
Greg Nini et al., Creditor Control Rights, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value, 25 REV. FIN. STUD.
1713, 1713–15 (2012).
303. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry,
1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 231–39
(2002); Michael Bradley & Michael R. Roberts, The Structure and Pricing of Corporate Debt Cov-
enants 2, 8–9 (May 13, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id466240.
304. See Yakov Amihud et al., A New Governance Structure for Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN. L. REV.
447, 458 (1999); Joel Houston & Christopher James, Bank Information Monopolies and the Mix of
Private and Public Debt Claims, 51 J. FIN. 1863, 1870–79 (1996); Marcel Kahan & Bruce Tuckman,
Private vs. Public Lending: Evidence from Covenants 11–13 (UCLA, Anderson Graduate Sch. Mgmt.,
Working Paper No. 13–93, 1993), available at http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/1xw4w7sk.
305. George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Gover-
nance, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1073, 1093–94 (1995).
306. See Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131, 134–35 (1989);
Oliver Hart & John Moore, Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1, 2
(1998).
307. See Fischel, supra note 306, at 136 (“To decrease the amount of compensation demanded,
borrowers will attempt to allay lenders’ concerns by agreeing to various monitoring and bonding
mechanisms. An illustration of a monitoring mechanism is an agreement whereby the borrower
promises to provide the lender with periodic financial information so that the lender can make more
informed decisions. Examples of bonding mechanisms include the provision of personal guarantees
and/or security for the loan, as well as various types of loan covenants limiting the discretion of the
borrower.”).
308. See Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution of Debt: Covenants, the Credit Market, and Corpo-
rate Governance, 34 J. CORP. L. 641, 667–70 (2009).
309. See supra Table 3 and accompanying text.
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discipline.310
To summarize, our study finds that lawyer-directors lower firm risk, using
ZSCOREi,t and IMPLVOLi,t as measures of risk-taking. The risk-reducing effect
is even more significant when the lawyer-director is also the board’s chairman
or chairman of the risk management committee. In addition, inside lawyer-
directors are more likely to reduce corporate risk more significantly than outside
lawyer-directors. Their ability to reduce risk is principally through changes in
CEO compensation (CEO DELTAi,t1 and CEO VEGAi,t1), the efficient man-
agement of distributive litigation (SECURITIES_LAWi,t1, CLASSACTIONi,t1,
and ACCOUNTING_LITi,t1) and litigation that helps define the ownership
boundaries of a firm’s intangible assets (PATENT_LITi,t1), and their influence
on board structure and takeover protections. The greater stability means that
firms can efficiently increase their borrowing capacity, which can lower their
cost of capital, as well as provide a monitoring benefit. As a result, we have the
potential for an organizational structure—based on the particular characteristics
of a lawyer-director—that provides greater value to shareholders.
In fact, as we discuss in the next section, having a lawyer on the board
increases firm value.311 Importantly, the effect is significant even after control-
ling for other, outside directors. Lawyer-directors provide a particular value in
excess of what is provided by nonlawyer outsiders.312 That value is even greater
when the lawyer-director is also an employee of the firm, such as a director who
is also a lawyer-CEO or lawyer-CFO.313
B. TOBIN’S Q AND FIRM VALUE
Our prior analyses considered the impact of lawyer-directors on executive
incentives, litigation, and risk-taking. The analyses, however, did not reveal
whether lawyer-directors are efficient. In Table 6, Panel A, we considered the
effect of lawyer-directors on firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q.314 We found
that having a lawyer on the board statistically increases firm value and that the
result is economically significant.
Panel A shows the effect of lawyer-directors on firm value. We controlled for
NYSE-Listedi,t1, SIZEi,t1, AVSALESGROWTHi,t1, DIVIDENDSi,t1,
CASHi,t1, OUTSIDE_DIRECTORSi,t1, year, and industry indicator variables,
except for Tobit Model (2). In both the OLS and Tobit model315 regressions of
Tobin’s Q on JDi,t1, Model (1) and Model (2) show that the presence of a
310. See Jensen, supra note 67, at 852.
311. See infra Table 6, Panel A, and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
313. See infra notes 330–32 and accompanying text.
314. Tobin’s Q is described supra in note 118.
315. A Tobit model is a nonlinear model proposed by James Tobin that allows for truncation of the
dependent variable at zero (a non-negative dependent variable) and describes the relationship between
the dependent variable and a set of independent variables. The truncation is needed because the
dependent variable (the Tobin’s Q), representing the ratio of the firm’s market value divided by the
replacement cost of its assets, cannot be negative. For the Tobit model, see James Tobin, Estimation of
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lawyer-director statistically increases firm value. Turning to the economic signifi-
cance of the results, we also found:
● Having a lawyer on the board increases Tobin’s Q by 9.5%.316 When we
restrict JDi,t1 to exclude JD_OUTSIDEi,t1, having a lawyer-director
who is also a company executive increases Tobin’s Q by 10.2%.317
● Our results are comparable if we use alternative specifications of lawyer-
director participation on the board, such as a lawyer-director also being
chairman of the board or the compensation committee.
● There is an even stronger effect in Model (3), utilizing Predicted JDi,t1.
A one standard deviation increase in Predicted JDi,t1 is associated with
a nearly 10.9% increase in Tobin’s Q.318
● Our results on lawyer-directors and corporate risk-taking are robust after
performing first-difference regressions that control for all firm character-
istics.319
Next, in Table 6, Panels B and C, we examined the two channels through
which lawyer-directors could enhance firm value. Those two channels are the
choice of CEO incentives (Panel B) and litigation management (Panel C). Our
results demonstrate that a CEO enhances firm value primarily through her effect
on CEO compensation and litigation, both of which cause a reduction in firm
risk-taking to more efficient levels.
As Panel B indicates, even though CEO incentives can lead to an increase in
firm value, that increase is amplified when a lawyer is on the board. More
precisely, Panel B shows that CEO VEGAi,t1 and CEO DELTAi,t1 increase
Tobin’s Q,320 but a lawyer-director amplifies the economic effect of CEO
VEGAi,t1 on Tobin’s Q by nearly 47.5%
321 and the economic effect of CEO
DELTAi,t1 on Tobin’s Q by nearly 47.6%.
322 The influence of a lawyer-director
is even greater if she has a prominent position on the board, such as chairman of
Relationships for Limited Dependent Variables, 26 ECONOMETRICA 24 (1958). See also Takeshi Amemiya,
Tobit Models: A Survey, 24 J. ECONOMETRICS 3 (1984).
316. This amount is calculated as the coefficient estimate of 0.271 divided by the average of Tobin’s
Q of 2.86 (as set out in Appendix B, Panel A).
317. When we restrict JDi,t1 to exclude JD_OUTSIDEi,t1, the coefficient estimate of lawyer-
directors who are not JD_OUTSIDEi,t1 is still significant at the 1% level, increasing from 0.271 to
0.292. Note that the presence of an executive lawyer-director is also associated with an increased
reduction in firm risk-taking. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
318. This amount is calculated as the value of the coefficient, 1.749, multiplied by the standard
deviation in Predicted JDi,t1, 0.179, divided by the average of Tobin’s Q of 2.86 (as set out in
Appendix B, Panel A).
319. The results are set out in Appendix C, which confirm the negative impact of JDi,t1 on corporate
risk-taking.
320. The correspondent coefficients are 0.00358 and 0.00021, both significant at the 1% level.
321. This amount is the ratio of the coefficient estimate of the interaction CEO VEGAi,t1  JDi,t1
(0.0017) to the estimate of the coefficient of CEO VEGAi,t1 (0.00358).
322. This amount is the ratio of the coefficient estimate of the interaction CEO DELTAi,t1  JDi,t1
(0.0001) to the estimate of the coefficient of CEO DELTAi,t1 (0.00021).
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the compensation committee.
We also investigated the effects on firm value of a lawyer-director’s influ-
ence on board structure and takeover protections using the same controls as in
Table 6, Panel B.323 BOARDSIZEi,t1, EINDEXi,t1, CEOCHAIRi,t1, and
STAGGEREDi,t1 have a negative impact on Tobin’s Q.
324 However, when
those variables were interacted with a lawyer-director, our qualitative findings
shifted directionally from a decrease to an increase in firm value.325
Previously, Table 5, Panels C and D showed the effect of a lawyer-director on
reducing risk through the litigation channel.326 Although lawyer-directors may
be better able to manage litigation than nonlawyers, we could not conclude from
Table 5 whether the reduction in risk was efficient. The next panel shows the
effect of litigation on firm value when there is a lawyer-director.
Securities law, class action, and accounting malpractice litigation reduce
Tobin’s Q (all coefficients are statistically significant at least at 5%). When there
is a lawyer-director, however, the result is reversed and all coefficients are
statistically significant at least at 5%.327 Patent litigation has a positive impact
323. The results have not been tabulated because most of the coefficient estimates are not statisti-
cally significant.
324. These results appear online at http://georgetownlawjournal.org/articles/lawyers-and-fools/.
325. These results appear online at http://georgetownlawjournal.org/articles/lawyers-and-fools/.
326. See supra Table 5, Panels C and D.
327. This finding is consistent with an earlier study which showed that firms convicted of engaging
in illegal corporate behavior experience lower accounting returns over five years and slower sales
growth during years three to five. Multiple convictions increase the negative effect on longer-term
performance. See Melissa S. Baucus & David A. Baucus, Paying the Piper: An Empirical Examination
of Longer-Term Financial Consequences of Illegal Corporate Behavior, 40 ACAD. MGMT. J. 129,

































This panel presents summary coefficient estimates of regressions similar to those in Table 6, Panel A, with the dependent
variable being Tobin’s Q and the explanatory variables being JDi,t1, JD_OUTSIDEi,t1, JD_CHAIRMANi,t1, JD_CHAIR-
_COMPCOMi,t1, and JD_COMPCOMi,t1, all interacted with CEO DELTAi,t1 and CEO VEGAi,t1. We controlled for (but,
for brevity, do not show) NYSE-Listedi,t1, SIZEi,t1, AVSALESGROWTHi,t1, DIVIDENDSi,t1, CASHi,t1, OUTSIDE_DI-
RECTORSi,t1, and year and industry fixed effects (industry is defined using the Fama-French 49 industry portfolios). The
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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on firm value, and when there is a lawyer-director, the impact is even higher.
To evaluate the economic importance of the results, we referred to the
estimates of Relative Economic Effect328 in Table 6, Panel C.
● Lawyer-directors increase the effect of patent litigation on firm value by
13.2%.329
● Accounting malpractice litigation reduces firm value, but the result is
reversed when there is a lawyer-director. In that case, there is a nearly
146–47 (1997). Thus, managing investigations (as well as minimizing illegal activities) can enhance
firm value.
328. Relative Economic Effect is the ratio of (i) the economic effect of the litigation category
interacted with JDi,t1 to (ii) the economic effect of the same litigation category.
329. This amount is calculated as the ratio of the coefficient estimate of PATENT_LITi,t1  JDi,t1
in Model (1) of 0.0332 to the coefficient estimate of PATENT_LITi,t1 of 0.2428.
Table 6—Panel C. Lawyer-Directors and Firm Value.
Dependent Variable: TOBINi,t









PATENT_LITi,t1  JDi,t1 0.0332**
(2.27)


















Observations 10,409 10,409 10,409 10,409
Adjusted R-squared 18.2% 17.6% 17.9% 18.4%






This panel presents the impact on Tobin’s Q of JDi,t1 and PATENT_LITi,t1, SECURITIES_LITi,t1,
CLASSACTION_LITi,t1, and ACCOUNTING_LITi,t1, where the litigation variables are also interacted with JDi,t1. We
controlled for (but, for brevity, do not show) NYSE-Listedi,t1, SIZEi,t1, AVSALESGROWTHi,t1, DIVIDENDSi,t1,
CASHi,t1, OUTSIDE_DIRECTORSi,t1, and year and industry fixed effects (industry is defined using the Fama-French 49
industry portfolios). Observation count and a measure of fit (adjusted R-squared) are also shown. The ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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308% increase in the effect of accounting malpractice litigation on firm
value compared to when no lawyer is on the board.330
● Securities law and class action litigation reduce firm value, but the result
is also reversed when there is a lawyer-director. In that case, there is an
almost 155%331 and almost 65%332 increase in the effect of such
litigation on firm value compared to when no lawyer is on the board.
Our results tell us that, on average, a lawyer-director increases firm value by
9.5%, an increase that rises to 10.2% when the lawyer-director is also a
corporate officer. She does so primarily through her effect on CEO compensa-
tion and on litigation, both of which cause a reduction in firm risk-taking to
more efficient levels as indicated by the rise in Tobin’s Q. Her influence on
board structure and takeover protections may also add to firm value. The influence of
a lawyer-director is even greater if she has a prominent position on the board.
The results also tell us that director composition is important to understand-
ing the board’s value to shareholders. The board’s primary function as an
agency-cost reducer may have been appropriate in the past, but companies have
grown too complex for value-maximizing boards to simply act as monitors. For
some firms, greater management by the board and alternatives to traditional
monitoring can increase firm value more efficiently than the standard construct.
To that extent, our results caution against a one-size-fits-all approach to the board.
Interfering with the ability of shareholders, directors, and other stakeholders to order
their own affairs may impose a less-efficient, less-flexible model of corporate gover-
nance on organizations with vastly different needs and characteristics.
Our analysis flies in the face of regulatory and quasi-regulatory requirements
that, except for financial literacy, focus predominantly on a director’s indepen-
dence as a means to enhance board oversight and firm value333 and initiatives to
break up the dual CEO-chairman role.334 To some extent, our study may simply
reflect the need for board composition to be flexible in order to respond to
changes in the business environment.335 Rising levels of regulation and litiga-
tion336 may make lawyer-directors the current “flavor of the month.” Lawyer-
330. This amount is calculated as the ratio of the coefficient estimate of ACCOUNTING_LITi,t1 
JDi,t1 in Model (4) of 0.5478 to the coefficient estimate of ACCOUNTING_LITi,t1 of 0.1779.
331. This amount is calculated as the ratio of the coefficient estimate of SECURITIES_LITi,t1 
JDi,t1 in Model (2) of 0.1687 to the coefficient estimate of SECURITIES_LITi,t1 of 0.1091.
332. This amount is calculated as the ratio of the coefficient estimate of CLASSACTION_LITi,t1 
JDi,t1 in Model (3) of 0.0686 to the coefficient estimate of CLASSACTION_LITi,t1 of 0.1056.
333. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text; see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rediscover-
ing Board Expertise: Legal Implications of the Empirical Literature, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 465, 466 (2008)
(explaining the renewed emphasis on director expertise over director independence that resulted from
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002).
334. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. Recall that inside lawyer-directors—perhaps due to
their superior knowledge of the company—have an even greater effect on risk-taking and Tobin’s Q
than outsiders. See supra notes 276, 332 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 17, 42, 82–84 and accompanying text.
336. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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directors, however, appear to add more than simply their litigation skills.
Lawyer-directors also have a risk-reducing effect on CEO compensation337 and
the overall level of risk a firm will assume.338 In addition, lawyer-directors have
a positive effect on board structure and takeover protections that could other-
wise cause a decline in firm value.339 Those outcomes appear to be less a
response to litigation and regulation, and more the product of efforts by
lawyer-directors to enhance internal governance. The result is greater firm
value, but now based on the particular management skills and experience that
directors bring to the job.
What we do not know is whether the current cost-benefit balance of having a
lawyer-director is optimal—in other words, whether or not a decline in the size
of the board, a further increase in the number of independent directors, or a
weakening of the firm’s takeover protections would provide even more value.
What our study shows, however, is that it clearly matters who is on the
board—and the particular training, skills, and experience that directors bring
can matter as much, or perhaps even more, to firm value than whether a director
is independent.
CONCLUSION
This Article is the first to analyze the value of a lawyer on the board of a
public corporation. A lawyer-director’s effect on risk-taking and firm value is
significant, primarily through changes in CEO compensation and how litigation
is managed. Our goal has not been to advocate that boards should include
lawyers among their ranks340—although, rather than fools, it appears that
lawyer-directors have some of the shrewdest clients. Rather, we have used
lawyer-directors to begin unpacking the black box that houses the board within
the standard framing of the firm. Within it, we find that board composition is an
important, but perhaps underappreciated, element of firm value.
The result is a natural arbitrage opportunity. If adding a lawyer-director
increases firm value on average, then smart investors should buy call options on
firms with no lawyer-directors. Doing so should be particularly valuable if the
firms are in industries where lawyers are often on the board, INDUSTRY JDi,t,
or the firms’ nonlawyer directors serve on boards that have a lawyer-director, JD
NETWORKi,t. Both are predictors of the presence of a lawyer-director and the
benefits that can arise after a lawyer joins the board. Likewise, value-
maximizing firms should encourage lawyers to join their boards. So why does
this apparent arbitrage persist?
One possibility is that market participants are unaware of the value of a
lawyer-director. They may understand the board to be dominated by the CEO—a
337. See supra Table 2, Panel A, and accompanying text.
338. See supra Table 5, Panel B, and accompanying text.
339. See supra Table 6, Panel B, and accompanying text.
340. Two of us, however, are lawyers, and would be excellent additions to any board.
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view that is largely outdated341—or they may understand the board’s value to be
limited to monitoring and agency cost reduction. A greater appreciation of the
skills and experience that lawyer-directors bring to managing the corporation
may quickly close the arbitrage opportunity.
A more likely possibility is that factors outside the corporation affect when a
lawyer will join the board. Recall that a lawyer faces greater-than-average risks,
compared to nonlawyers, when she becomes a director—as do the insurance
companies who provide liability coverage to lawyer-directors and their firms.342
Those insurers are likely to strongly discourage a lawyer from joining a board
or increase the premiums they charge in light of the greater risks that may
result. Individual costs, as a result, may outweigh the benefits, particularly if the
lawyer is an independent director, in light of the regulatory and quasi-regulatory
limits on the work she and her firm can do for the corporation.343 In other
words, rather than just misdirection, today’s focus on independence can lower a
firm’s ability to increase value by limiting the skills and experience available
within the pool of prospective directors.
Going forward, a greater appreciation of the value of board composition and
the directors’ managing function will help balance the focus on independence.
Clearly, there is a role for directors to continue their monitoring function. But
the particular value of lawyer-directors is significant even after controlling for
other, outside directors,344 and inside lawyer-directors provide still greater
value.345 Consequently, beyond independence, a complete analysis of today’s
board must also take account of the incremental value that results from the
particular skills and experience represented among the directors.
APPENDIX A—DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES
Below we present brief definitions of the main variables that appear in this
Article. For purposes of these definitions, i indexes  firms, j indexes  2-digit
SIC code industries, and t indexes  years in the panel.
KEY EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
JDi,t  1 if a legally trained board member is present on the board, 0
otherwise.
Predicted JDi,t  Predicted incidence of JDi,t based on the Probit model
estimated in Table 1, Column (1). In this model, we include two groups of
independent variables. The first group includes those variables that are relevant
determinants of JDi,t and that are also used as control variables in the model
regressions in Tables 2, 5, and 6. Those variables are GENERAL_LITi,t1,
341. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
342. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.
344. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 317, 332, and Table 6, Panel A, and accompanying text.
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SIZEi,t1, NYSE-Listedi,t1, COMPLEXITYi,t1, INSTITUTIONAL OWNi,t1,
as well as year indicator variables and industry indicator variables. The second
group includes JD NETWORKi,t1, SOXt, and INDUSTRY JDi,t1. These three
variables are exclusive determinants (or excluded instrumental variables) of the
likelihood of having a lawyer-director.346 For this reason, they are never in-
cluded as control variables in the model regressions in Tables 2, 5, and 6.
JD BOARD ROLES
JD_OUTSIDEi,t  Indicator variable equal to 1 if all lawyer-directors are
nonemployees, and 0 otherwise.
JD_CHAIRMANi,t  Indicator variable equal to 1 if one lawyer-director is
board chairman, and 0 otherwise.
JD_CHAIR_COMPCOMi,t  Indicator variable equal to 1 if one lawyer-
director is chairman of the board’s compensation committee, and 0 otherwise.
JD_CHAIR_RISKCOMi,t  Indicator variable equal to 1 if one lawyer-
director is chairman of the board’s risk management committee, and 0 other-
wise.
JD_COMPCOMi,t  Indicator variable equal to 1 if at least one lawyer-
director is a member of the board’s compensation committee, and 0 otherwise.
JD_RISKCOMi,t  Indicator variable equal to 1 if at least one lawyer-
director is a member of the board’s risk management committee, and 0 other-
wise.
BOARD CHARACTERISTICS
OUTSIDE_DIRECTORSi,t  Proportion of outside directors on the board,
calculated as the ratio of outside directors on the board over the total number of
directors on the board. The value of this variable is bound between 0 and 1.
BOARDSIZEi,t  Number of board members.
CEOCHAIRi,t  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also board
chairman, and 0 otherwise.
EINDEXi,t  Entrenchment Index (E Index).
347 Higher values of this index
imply higher levels of managerial entrenchment.
STAGGEREDi,t  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the board is staggered, and
0 otherwise.
CEO COMPENSATION MEASURES
All variables below are Winsorized at one percent in each tail of the
corresponding distribution.348
346. See supra note 151.
347. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
348. Winsorization is the process of transforming a variable’s distribution by limiting extreme values
in the statistical data in order to reduce the effect of possible outliers. This methodology was introduced
in Cecil Hastings, Jr., Frederick Mosteller, John W. Tukey & Charles P. Winsor, Low Moments for Small
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CEOSALARYi,t  Log of CEO Salary as reported in Execucomp. The
variable is further Winsorized at one percent in each tail of its distribution.
CEO-DELTAi,t  Percent change in the value of the CEO option portfolio
for a one percent increase in stock price.349 The variable is further Winsorized at
one percent in each tail of its distribution.
CEO-VEGAi,t  Percent change in the value of the CEO option portfolio for
a one percent increase in the volatility of the returns on the underlying stock.350
The variable is further Winsorized at one percent in each tail of its distribution.
CEO-EXCESSCOMPi,t  CEO Excess Compensation, defined as residual
in the OLS regression: log(Salaryi,t  Bonusi,t)  b1log(Salesi,t)  b2(CEO
Stocki,t  option ownershipi,t (%))  b3Agei,t  b4Years as CEOi,t  b5ROAi,t 
b6ROAi,t1  b7(Excess Stock Returni,t)  b8(Excess Stock Returni,t1)  g 
(Industry dummies)  h  (Year dummies).351
RISK MEASURES
All non-indicator variables below are Winsorized at one percent in each tail
of the corresponding distribution.
ZSCOREi,t  Defined as (3.3  EBIT/Assets  1  Revenue / Assets  1.4 
Retained Earnings / Assets  1.2  NWC/Assets).
IMPLVOLi,t  The average annual implied volatility for standardized call
options of ninety days maturity. The data is from the Option Metrics data-
base. The variable is further Winsorized at one percent in each tail of its
distribution.
TOBINi,t  Tobin’s Q, defined as the ratio of the market value of assets to
the book value of assets.352
OTHER VARIABLES DEFINITIONS
All non-indicator variables below are Winsorized at one percent in each tail
of the corresponding distribution.
AVSALESGROWTHi,t  Average sales growth over the preceding three
fiscal years. The source of the data is the Compustat database.
CASHi,t  Defined as the ratio of cash to total assets. The source of the data
is the Compustat database.
Samples: A Comparative Study of Order Statistics, 18 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICAL STAT. 413, 413–14
(1947). The technique is implemented by setting all outliers to a pre-specified percentile of the data. For
example, a 95 percent Winsorisation would imply setting all data below the 2.5th percentile to the 2.5th
percentile and data above the 97.5th percentile to the 97.5th percentile.
349. This measure is calculated using the same method as in Core & Guay, supra note 183.
350. This measure is calculated using the same method as in Core & Guay, supra note 183.
351. This measure is computed as excess compensation to a benchmark as in Philip G. Berger et al.,
Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions, 52 J. FIN. 1411, 1417 (1997).
352. See supra note 118.
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COMPLEXITYi,t  Number of Operating Segments recorded in the Compus-
tat Business Segment Historical File.
DIVIDENDSi,t  Defined as the ratio of dividends to book equity. The
source of the book equity data is the Compustat database.
INSTITUTIONAL OWNi,t  Percentage of stock held by institutional
investment managers. The source of the data is the Thomson Financial database
of Form 13F filings with the SEC, which provides institutional stock holdings
and transactions as reported on Form 13F.353
INTANGIBLE ASSETSi,t  The lowest decile of the ratio of tangible assets
to total assets, where tangible assets are defined as property, plant, and equip-
ment. The source of the data is the Compustat database.
NYSE-Listedi,t  Indicator equal to 1 if the firm is listed on the New York
Stock Exchange and 0 otherwise. The source of the data is the Compustat
database.
SIZEi,t  Log of total assets (Compustat item AT) at the start of the year. The
source of the data is the Compustat database.
LITIGATION RISK VARIABLES
GENERAL_LITi,t  Estimated probability of securities law and class action
litigation (as recorded in Audit Analytics),354 calculated as eSUE/(1eSUE),
where
SUEt  7.883  0.566  FPSt  0.518  Assetst1  0.982  Sales Growtht1  0.379 
Returnt1  0.108  Returnskewnesst1  25.635  Returnstddevt1  0.00007  Turnovert1.
FPS  1 if the firm is in the biotech (SIC codes 2833–2836 and 8731–
8734), computer (3570–3577 and 7370–7374), electronics (3600–3674), or
retail (5200–5961) industries, and 0 otherwise;
Assets  Total assets;
Return  Market-adjusted 12-month stock return;
Returnskewness  Skewness of the firm’s 12-month return;
Returnstddev  Standard deviation of the firm’s 12-month return;
Sales Growth  Current year sales less last year’s sales, scaled by total
assets at the beginning of the current year;
Turnover  Daily trading volume accumulated over the fiscal year, scaled
by the beginning of the year’s shares outstanding (in thousands).
LITIGATION CATEGORIES
The source of data is the Audit Analytics (AA) Litigation files. Each category
is defined as an indicator variable that includes the actual litigation categories
(as presented in the AA Litigation files) noted in the description section. We
note in parentheses the relevant AA Litigation category code.
353. See supra note 119.
354. Based on Model (3) in Irene Kim & Douglas J. Skinner, Measuring Securities Litigation Risk,
53 J. ACCT. & ECON. 290, 302 (2012).
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Litigation Category Description (as presented in AA Litigation files)
SECURITIES_LITi,t  Securities Laws (41)
CLASSACTION_LITi,t  Class Action (1)
PATENT_LITi,t  Patent Law (35), Trademark Law (44), Copyright Law (12)
ACCOUNTING_LITi,t  Accounting Malpractice (2)
OPTION_BACK-
DATING_ LITi,t  Stock Options Backdating (55)
EXCLUDED INSTRUMENTS
INDUSTRY JDi,t  Industry (2-digit SIC code) cumulative density function
of the likelihood of having lawyer-director(s) for any given year t and industry
j. We use this variable for each observation (for each corporation i in year t,
where corporation i is a member of industry j in year t).
JD NETWORKi,t  An indicator variable equal to 1 if at least one board
member in any given year was also on another board in the prior year that
included a lawyer-director, and 0 otherwise.
SOXt  An indicator variable equal to 1 after adoption of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, and 0 otherwise.
APPENDIX B—SELECTED SUMMARY DATA
APPENDIX B—PANEL A
Below we report selected summary statistics related to our analyses. These
data are based on the Fama-French 49 industry portfolios, excluding financial
firms.






JDi,t 0.41 0 0.49 0 1
Predicted JDi,t 0.44 0.438 0.179 0.22 0.68
Key Dependent Variables
CEO VEGAi,t 69 22.95 123.10 0.0 189.5
CEO DELTAi,t 497 145.2 1,226.6 14.9 1,080.6
ZSCOREi,t 1.659 1.803 1.843 0.288 3.400
IMPLVOLi,t 0.401 0.402 0.186 0.235 0.688
TOBINi,t 2.86 2.14 2.60 0.83 5.69
BOARDSIZEi,t 9.06 9 2.3 6 12
CEOCHAIRi,t 0.60 1 0.49 0 1
EINDEXi,t 2.79 3 1.35 1 5
STAGGEREDi,t 0.60 1 0.12 0 1
LEVERAGEi,t 0.20 0.17 0.19 0 0.41
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GENERAL_LITi,t 0.37 0.27 0.29 0.07 0.86
PATENT_LITi,t 0.204 0 0.28 0 0.65
SECURITIES_LITi,t 0.142 0.017 0.219 0 0.45
CLASSACTION_LITi,t 0.176 0.08 0.244 0 0.50
ACCOUNTING_LITi,t 0.047 0 0.125 0 0.15
OPTION_BACKDATING_LITi,t 0.0032 0 0.056 0 0
Key Variables Predicting JDi,t
SIZEi,t 7.35 7.2 1.603 5.4 9.6
COMPLEXITYi,t 1.47 1 1.23 1 3
INDUSTRY JDi,t 0.41 0.39 0.138 0.22 0.62
JD NETWORKi,t 0.43 0 0.26 0 1
NYSEi,t 0.58 1 0.49 0 1
First-difference Variables
JDi,t 0.015 0 0.263 0 0.03
ZSCOREi,t 0.06 0.004 0.8196 0.68 0.46
IMPLVOLi,t 0.099 0.01 1.949 0.12 0.18
TOBINi,t 0.15 0.03 2.0006 1.55 1.04
APPENDIX B—PANEL B
This panel shows personal characteristics, committee assignments, leadership
roles, and compensation of lawyer-directors.
Variables Average Std. Dev.
Personal Characteristics
Age 62.8 8.1
Gender (Percent male) 0.88 0.33
Number of Board Memberships 1.96 1.31
Committee Assignments
Number of Committees Assigned 3.44 3.02
Audit Comm. Member 0.22 0.42
Nominating/Governance Comm. Member 0.27 0.44
Compensation Comm. Member 0.33 0.47
Risk Comm. Member 0.33 0.46
Leadership Roles
Chairman of the Board 0.07 0.25
Audit Comm. Chair 0.09 0.28
Nominating/Governance Comm. Chair 0.27 0.44
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Variables Average Std. Dev.
Compensation Comm. Chair 0.14 0.34
Risk Comm. Chair 0.14 0.35
Compensation (in US$ thousands)
Cash (Salary) 53.596 47.68
Equity (Stock & Options) 123.044 165.33
Total Annual Compensation 176.64 256.12
APPENDIX C—ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
In this Appendix, we perform a first-difference regression to verify the
robustness of our results regarding the impact of JDi,t1 on each of the follow-
ing variables: ZSCOREi,t, IMPLVOLi,t, and Tobin’s Q.
Appendix C—Panel A. Lawyer-Directors and Risk-Taking.355

































Adj. R-squared 11.7% 11.7%
First-difference regressions of dependent variables ZSCOREi,t and IMPLVOLi,t on independent variable JDi,t1. We
control for CEO DELTAi,t1, CEO VEGAi,t1, SIZEi,t1, AVSALESGROWTHi,t1, DIVIDENDSi,t1, and CASHi,t1.
Observation count and a measure of goodness of fit (adjusted R-squared) are shown. The ***, **, and * indicate significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
We find that the coefficient JDi,t1 is always positive and statistically
significant. Concerning its economic significance, we report that a one stan-
355. The analytical description of the regression models underlying this table and the other tables in
this Article are online at http://georgetownlawjournal.org/articles/lawyers-and-fools/.
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dard deviation increase in JDi,t1 (0.263) is associated with a standard
deviation increase of 22 basis points in ZSCOREi,t (calculated as 0.263,
multiplied by the coefficient estimate of 0.007, divided by the standard devia-
tion of ZSCOREi,t, i.e., 0.8196) and a standard deviation decrease of 37 basis
points in IMPLVOLi,t (calculated as 0.263, multiplied by the coefficient
estimate of 0.027, divided by the standard deviation of IMPLVOLi,t, i.e.,
1.949).
Appendix C—Panel B. Lawyer-Directors and Risk-Taking356














First-difference regressions of dependent variable TOBINi,t on independent variable JDi,t1. We control for SIZEi,t1,
AVSALESGROWTHi,t1, DIVIDENDSi,t1, and CASHi,t1. Observation count and a measure of goodness of fit
(adjusted R-squared) are shown. The ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
We find that the coefficient JDi,t1 is always positive and statistically
significant. Concerning its economic significance, we report that a one standard
deviation increase in JDi,t1 is associated with a nearly 3.2% of standard
deviation increase in Tobin’s Q (calculated as 0.263, multiplied by the coeffi-
cient estimate of 0.241, divided by the standard deviation of TOBINi,t, i.e.,
2.0006).
356. The analytical description of the regression models underlying this table and the other tables in
this Article are online at http://georgetownlawjournal.org/articles/lawyers-and-fools/.
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